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“ Tiger got to hunt,
Bird got to fly;
Man got to sit and wonder, “Why, why, why?"
Tiger got to sleep,
Bird got to land;
Man got to tell himself he understand.
”Cat’s Cradle , Kurt Vonnegut
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to start with a statement: I have never been in a good relationship with words.
Using language appropriately to reflect how I feel and think is always a challenge for me
even in my native language. Please bear with me and read with your own inner voice and
imagine how I might feel while writing these pages.
I owe the greatest gratitude to my advisor, Filippo Menczer. I am very lucky to know
him and to feel his endless support during all the stages of my academic career. None of
these would be possible without his support and great mentorship. Here I would like to
share my perspective as one of his graduate students because everyone I met already knows
how great he is as an advisor and as a colleague. He is always patient with me even at 2 AM
when fixing the smallest grammar mistakes I made like a father teaching a toddler how to
walk. He is the most open-minded person, who believed in me and supported my dreams. I
remember days when he boosted our motivation by inviting us for a quick foosball game. It
was an honor to work with him. He set the bar really high and I feel responsible for being
as good an advisor as he. I should also thank Colleen Menczer for her hospitality in the
NaN Labor day parties. Without her understanding and support for Fil, some of our papers
that required working late at night just before the deadline wouldn’t have been submitted
in their best shape.
All Ph.D. students wish to have a good advisor and I am exceptionally lucky to have
two. Alessandro Flammini is a great mentor. His critical thinking and suggestions always
improved our work and papers. Our motto is “Today is the day!" and by repeating this
v
every day we collected precious memories indicated as |ℵ|. His encouragement always keeps
my excitement alive.
Emilio Ferrara was one of the first people with whom I interacted in our research group.
I remember the day when he left Granovetter’s paper on my desk like yesterday. We have
been collaborating on several projects, many of these are part of this thesis. He is a great
role model and his ambition for doing research provided me with an early momentum. Since
our first paper together I have been following his never-ending enthusiasm.
I would like to give my sincere thanks to my research committee Christine Ogan, Yong-
Yeol Ahn, andWeihua An for agreeing to serve on my committee, their constructive feedback,
and support. I acquired a rich set of skills and experiences from their classroom. I would
also like to thank Christine Ogan for our collaborative project on Gezi protests. In my
last semester, I had a chance to develop teaching skills as a teaching assistance in Filippo
Radicchi’s class. I would like to thank him for creating this opportunity for me.
Prior to joining IU, I had great teachers and advisors during my education in all levels.
I would like to thank one more time Nazim Yilmaz, Nurten Alpaslan, Mustak Erhan Yalcin,
Ayze Erzan, Deniz Yuret, and Alkan Kabakcioglu. They had a tremendous impact on my
professional development. I would also like to thank Hasan Murat Akinci and my dear
friends from OTOKON student branch for providing me with the mindset to learn how to
rapidly prototype and evaluate several ideas.
During my two summer internships at Microsoft Research, I had a great experience in
doing research outside of my group. I had a chance to observe the great environment of an
industry research lab. I especially would like to thank Emre Kiciman for his mentorship and
professional advice. During my internship, I had great collaborators and I want to thank
Abhimanyu Das, Sreenivas Gollapudi, and Alexandra Olteanu.
I always appreciated our friendly environment in the NaN group. Over the years we had
vi
several alumni and graduate students. We had wonderful tea hours, foosball tournaments,
lunch breaks together. I would like to thank Mohsen Jafariasbagh, Lilian Weng, Jasleen
Kaur, Dimitar Nikolov, Azadeh Nematzadeh, Clayton Davis, Prashant Shiralkar, Qing Ke,
and other members of the NaN. Our endeavor on bot detection wouldn’t be as successful
without Clayton’s diverse skillset and Prashant’s collaboration in the DARPA challenge.
I would also like to thank Tara Holbrook, Linda Hostetter, and Christi Pike for providing
administrative help and patiently answering all my question over the years. The tech support
team at SoIC, especially Rob Henderson and Dave Cooley, have provided tremendous help.
I would also like to thank Kyle Thompson for assisting me on my OPT application.
During my busy working days in Bloomington, I was fortunate to have great friends to
go out and have some drinks. I want to thank Hasan Kurban who is a great friend and
was my witness at my wedding. I am happy that he introduced himself in the statistics
class that we took together. I also deserve the honor to make him a real coffee drinker by
forcing him to stop eating sugary Starbucks drinks. I would also like to thank my dear
friend Murat Ozturk. In my last year in Bloomington, we shared the same house but more
importantly, we engaged in very deep and intellectually stimulating conversations. I hope
Murat will remember our time at IU in the future and continue our friendship since I choose
to be a “poor, miserable” academic rather than going to a well-paying industry job. During
my Ph.D., I have been commuting between Bloomington and South Bend. I want to thank
our friends at the University of Notre Dame: Muslum and Yeter Aydogmus, Aylin Acun,
and Isik Can.
I am thankful to my beloved family. They have been very supportive and I am very
lucky to have them. I also want to thank my talented and wonderful sister Beril Varol, who
patiently read some of my early drafts. I feel sorry that I cannot go back home often to see
how you grow up to be a wonderful woman and share experiences and struggles of my family.
vii
I would like to use this opportunity to send a Turkish message to my parents: “Bunlar daha
antrenman diye diye annemin diledigi kursulere iyice yaklastim. Sizi seviyorum.” I also
would like to thank my parents-in-law, Salih and Hatice Mustafaoglu, for their prayers and
support. Thanks to Nuray and Yavuz Cicek for our fun Skype meetings in the weekends
and their company during our time in Turkey.
I do not even know how to thank my incredible wife, Nur Mustafaoglu, because I cannot
imagine a version of myself that exists in a parallel universe without her. She has been
everything to me. She is my motivation to work hard on the weekdays to create more time
with her over the weekend. I love these lyrics by the Proclaimers “I would walk 500 miles;
And I would walk 500 more; Just to be the man who walked a 1000 miles; To fall down at
your door.” We are more than two bodies across Indiana but one heart beating together. I
love you so much ♥.
The most difficult part of completing my Ph.D. is the realization of how much I will miss
my days at IU. Happiness is the most important aspect of life because I believe anything is
possible when people find happiness in their work and life.
“ “I’m just one hundred and one, five months and a day.”
“I can’t believe that!” said Alice.
“Can’t you?” the Queen said in a pitying tone. “Try again: draw a long
breath, and shut your eyes.”
Alice laughed. “There’s no use trying,” she said: “one can’t believe impos-
sible things.”
“I daresay you haven’t had much practice,” said the Queen. “When I was
your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve
believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.”
”Through the Looking Glass, Lewis Carroll
viii
* This thesis was supported in part by DARPA grant W911NF-12-1-0037, NSF grant
CCF-1101743, ONR grant N15A-020-0053, and the J.S. McDonnell Foundation. I would also
like to thank the School of Informatics and Computing at Indiana University Bloomington
and supporters of student travel funding that I received in the past 5 years.
ix
Onur Varol
ANALYZING SOCIAL BIG DATA TO STUDY ONLINE DISCOURSE AND ITS
MANIPULATION
The widespread use of social media helps people connect and share their
opinions and experiences with millions of others, while simultaneously bringing
new threats. This dissertation aims to provide insights into analysis of online
conversations and mechanisms that might be used for their manipulation. The
first part delves into the effect of geography on information dissemination and
user roles in online discourse. I study trending topics on Twitter to highlight
mechanisms governing the diffusion of local and national trends. My analysis
points to three locally geographic regions and one cluster that contains trend-
setting cities coinciding with major travel hubs. When factors limiting informa-
tion spread are considered, censorship mechanisms mandated by governments
are found to be ineffective and even show a correlation with increasing popu-
larity. I also present an analysis of spatiotemporal characteristics and distinct
user roles in the Gezi movement. Next, I discuss different forms of social media
manipulation. Malicious entities can employ promotion campaigns and social
bots. We build machine learning frameworks that exploit features extracted
from network, content, and users to train accurate supervised learning models.
Our system for early detection of promoted social media trends harnesses mul-
tidimensional time series signals to reveal subtle differences between promoted
and organic trends. In my research on social bots, I carried out the largest study
of the human-bot ecosystem to date. Our estimates suggest that between 9 and
15% of active Twitter accounts are bots. I present distinct behavioral groups
and interaction strategies among human and bot accounts. This body of work
contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of online user behavior and
to the development of systems to detect online abuse.
Filippo Menczer, Ph.D., Chairperson
Alessandro Flammini, Ph.D., Member
Yong-Yeol Ahn, Ph.D., Member
Christine L. Ogan, Ph.D., Member
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
“ “Begin at the beginning,” the King said, very gravely, “and go on till you
come to the end: then stop.”
”Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
1.1 Motivation
Communication is a central part of society and crucial for human evolution [171]. All forms of
living develop or inherit ways to interact with each other [304]. Shannon’s ground-breaking
work formally defines components of efficient communication systems and introduces con-
cepts about information, noise, and bandwidth [253]. Throughout human history, we can
see all forms of communication: verbal, written, and artistic expressions. Even the simplest
form of communication, drawing, serves as records to communicate with future generations.
The formation of signals and invention of languages are inevitable for evolving groups and
systems to transfer information [261]. Over the centuries, technology helped us to develop
more efficient models of communication. The invention of the telegraph and the telephone
overcame the difficulty of transmitting information to distant places. These peer-to-peer
communication systems mirror our natural interactions.
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Each communication system consists of three main components: sender, receiver, and
media for dissemination. In most cases transmission between the sender and the receiver
is not perfect and this can be attributed to the noise interfering in the media or how in-
formation is encoded and decoded by the sender and the receiver respectively. It has also
been observed that the sender adjusts its language and style to align with its audience [92].
Examples of language and style matching can be seen in language mimicry observed in
the context of power differentials between discussants [89] and prediction of message pop-
ularity [269]. In social psychology, there has been a large body of work on persuasion and
social influence [63,71,306] that talks about various cognitive theories and psychological pro-
cesses behind how people convince and persuade each other. Guadagno and Cialdini discuss
persuasion and compliance in the context of Internet-mediated communications, especially
textual messages [144].
As the information within our reach grows exponentially, attention becomes the limiting
factor in the consumption of the information. Human communication is limited due to evo-
lutionary pressure to focus attention and use our resources efficiently [108]. Herbert Simon
introduced the term attention economy to explain human attention as a scarce commodity
and economic theory behind the various information processing strategies [260].
To overcome attention and noise limitations, we invent different modes of communication.
When popularity and influence of the content are taken into account, information producers
should adapt different strategies to convey their messages or use a medium that supports
broader dissemination. To save time when sharing the same content, we broadcast to larger
audiences. Broadcasting information in large-scale introduces new one-to-many channels for
information dissemination. Radio, television, and newspapers are examples of one-to-many
communication.
The unprecedented increase in social media use may be the result of our limited attention
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and desire to reach information fast. Using the Internet, we can access vast amounts of
information anytime we want. We can also prioritize, filter, and endorse relevant context.
Researchers emphasize the importance of the Internet to study mass communication and
how theories about communication can be applied to this new medium [211]. The Internet
provides a reliable infrastructure to access and disseminate information. In this dissertation,
I draw some parallels between existing theories and their correspondence in social media
analysis.
The concept of diffusion is not new. We can think of diffusion as information transferred
between individuals. Everett Rogers studied diffusion of innovations [244]. His ground-
breaking work laid out the properties of each elements necessary for a successful diffusion
system: innovation, adopter, communication channel, time, and social system.
Every communication system has a certain level of noise and disruption that impacts
the efficiency of the overall system. Temporal durability of message and limited attention of
the receivers may be some of the significant challenges for earlier communication systems.
Recently, we have been facing more serious problems: deception, censorship, and abuse.
Volume and velocity of the online data facilitate manipulation and targeting strategies to-
ward certain groups with a higher rate of success. Researchers study these problems and
develop systems to prevent unwanted consequences. Efforts to educate Internet users are
also a great endeavor to prevent the dissemination of unreliable and misleading news.
Politics in broad terms can be defined as the process of making decisions that apply to
all members of the groups, or alternatively, politics can be defined as the person who tries
to influence the way a country is governed. To obtain such power and influence, politicians
work towards obtaining trust and persuading oppositions to change their attitudes. To reach
their goals, they use available technologies efficiently.
In the political system, we have been observing the impact of different communication
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Figure 1.1: Timeline of US politics and its relation with the technological developments.
Some of the key events are selected. The top panel presents influence of traditional commu-
nication media such as newspapers, radio and television. The bottom panel starts with the
invention of the Web and presents some key events of US politics on the Internet.
media and how politicians adapt their strategies to influence and persuade voters and cit-
izens [59]. We depicted a timeline representation of technological development and how
politicians adopt these trends in Fig. 1.1.
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In the early days, newspapers and telegraph were important to diffuse news [41, 111].
These technologies accelerated the information diffusion rate from days to hours. Organiz-
ing public speeches in parks and squares became more convenient because organizing and
informing a broader audience became possible in the early 19th century. Important policy
decisions and public affairs could also be shared more conveniently.
The invention of the telephone and the radio, in the 1870s and 1920s respectively, created
opportunities for politicians to reach out to larger groups. Television changed political
campaigns significantly [24,259,300]. Only ten years after the first news aired on the BBC,
President Truman gave his presidential speech live on TV in 1947. This trend was followed by
the first TV advertisement by Eisenhower in 1952 and the first presidential debate between
Kennedy and Nixon in 1960. One estimate of President Truman’s campaign indicates that
he could travel more than 31k miles and meet 500k voters in person. Almost four years later,
Eisenhower reached millions through television advertisements [102]. It is also important
to note that those political contacts during campaigns also changed to become carefully
engineered and studied.
The information age has transformed our experience in various ways. The Internet turns
out to be a valuable resource to study and answer valuable questions about communication
in general [211]. Politicians have become active users of the social media. They can engage
with their constituents and campaign on social networks. According to an analysis by the
Pew research center, 65% of US adults are actively using social media [233].
Observation and deliberate consideration of problems on social networks point to the
challenging questions: What are the implications of censorship on social media? How do
users behave during social upheavals? Can we detect online campaigns? How can we identify
and characterize social bots? This dissertation aims at providing a systematic analysis of
online discourse in terms of trend diffusion, censorship, and user behavior during a social
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upheaval. Manipulation of online discourse is also studied for detecting online campaigns
and social bots. The work presented in this dissertation is expected to have implications for
many fields, including social media analysis, online marketing, and prevention of abuse on
social media.
1.2 Research Questions and Overview
Studies of online discourse and its manipulation have great societal impact. We are using
social networks and online platforms in nearly every part of our lives. We reach out for
information, interact with friends and during all these processes we leave digital fingerprints
about our activities and behaviors. In this work, we are interested in how underlying systems
foster information diffusion for daily communication and are affected by external influences
such as censorship and social protests. The dynamic landscape of online networks is vulner-
able to attacks by malicious entities. Groups continuously try to influence public opinion,
to pollute public discourse, and to promote their ideas. Orchestrated campaigns and social
bots are ways to gain power on social networks.
In Part I, I present a study of information diffusion where geographic constraints are
introduced. We analyzed information diffusion in the context of popular memes such as
trends. In parallel, we analyzed social media censorship when popular or important content
is prevented from reaching a broader audience as a result of governmental requests. In
addition, we studied a social protest from Turkey. We characterized the role of users and
how exogenous events and collective behavior affect events as they unfold.
In Part II, I discuss the important problem of identifying social media campaigns. Social
media provide channels to propagate messages to people of interest. Some of this content
might be promoted by advertisements and gain artificial popularity. In this work, we analyze
Twitter trends and promoted hashtags to evaluate our system to detect campaigns.
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Part III focuses on social bots with several goals: (i) building a machine learning frame-
work that identifies bots with high accuracy; (ii) estimation of social bot presence on social
media; (iii) characterization of human-bot ecosystem and behaviors of social bots. The next
section introduces the general research questions examined in each part of this dissertation.
1.2.1 Part I: Analysis of Online Discourse
Starting from the geography of information diffusion in the context of trends and censorship,
we can ask the following research questions:
• What is the relation between geography and trends?
• Is censorship in a particular country sufficient to prevent diffusion of sen-
sitive content?
The work on trend diffusion is motivated by the observation of same or similar hashtags
emerging from different geographic regions before reaching country level popularity. We
identified three distinct geographical clusters in the US information flow (east coast, mid-
west, and southwest) as well as global patterns in the flow corresponding to main air traffic
hubs. We uncovered two distinct dynamics of diffusion: localized diffusion of popular con-
tent and global spread through major hubs. We showed that travel hubs act as trendsetters,
generating topics that eventually trend at the country level, then driving the conversation
across the country [116]. Analysis of censorship shows that withholding content from a par-
ticular country is not sufficient to eliminate diffusion of sensitive topics. Accounts following
censored discourse and censored users spread censored content by finding alternative ways
to breach those geographic limitations to reach and promote content [281].
We study information diffusion and user roles during social upheaval in Turkey. We
explore the following question to understand the dynamics of social protests and user roles:
• Is online user behavior affected by external factors and do such factors
cause the emergence of collective behavior?
7
Our work on the Gezi protests analyzes spatio-temporal characteristics of how events
unfold. We identified user roles based on their activity and involvement in information
creation. Our analysis reveals that the conversation becomes more democratic as events
unfold, with a redistribution of influence over time in the user population. We conclude by
observing how the online and oﬄine worlds are tightly intertwined, showing that exogenous
events, such as political speeches or police actions, affect social media conversations and
trigger changes in individual behavior [224,284].
1.2.2 Part II. Detection of Campaigns
Social discourse can be controlled and manipulated through orchestrated campaigns. In
this part of my dissertation, I analyzed promoted content on Twitter as a proxy for social
media campaigns. Our work on campaign classification and detection addresses the following
questions:
• How well can we distinguish promoted trends from organics ones?
• Can we detect campaigns in their early stages on Twitter?
In this work, we designed a machine learning framework to tackle this problem. Our su-
pervised learning framework exploits hundreds of time-varying features to capture changing
network and diffusion patterns, content and sentiment information, timing signals, and user
meta-data [117,283].
1.2.3 Part III. Analysis of Social Bots
Conversations on social media can also be manipulated by users controlled by automated
scripts called bots. This part of the dissertation analyzes social bots and their behaviors in
detail. We make the following contributions and answer several research questions:
• Can we build a highly-accurate framework to detect and study social bots?
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• What are some heuristics that we can use to detect social bots?
• What fraction of Twitter accounts are social bots?
• Can we quantify strategies adopted by social bots?
In this work, we start building a social bot detection system called BotOrNot1 and
an API for other researchers to use our system [94]. Leveraging the lessons learned from
BotOrNot we participated in the DARPA social bot detection challenge and we finished
this competition as the second fastest and the third most accurate team [266]. Using our
framework, we analyze a large-scale collection of active Twitter users to estimate the fraction
of active bot population on Twitter [282].
1Our system will soon be renamed BotOMeter.
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CHAPTER 2
Related Work
“ Nearly everything is really interesting if you go into it deeply enough. ”Richard P. Feynman,
The unprecedented increase in social media use brings many opportunities and threats
at the same time. Social media help people to connect and share their opinions and ex-
periences with millions of others. We can consider social media as a microscope for the
online world which magnifies individual and group behaviors. Using social media as a tool
researchers can study online protests, political debates, and changes in user behaviors. The
adoption of online systems has been changing the communication landscape; diffusion of
online information has exceeded the limits of earlier methods of communications such as
newspapers, radio, and television. These media all have an important role in information
diffusion. Nowadays the Internet provides instantaneous reach to information, but it also
enables the creation of misinformation. Malicious intentions can be observed in the form of
orchestrated campaigns and promotion of content with the help of social bots. Detection of
misinformation campaigns and social bots is crucial for our modern society. This chapter
summarizes and reviews existing literature on social media studies.
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Figure 2.1: Some of the notable examples of propaganda posters: “Uncle Sam" [123], “Daddy,
what did YOU do in the Great War?" [81], “We Can Do It!" [275], and a propaganda poster
from the USA against Nazis and Japanese during the WWII [124].
2.1 Propaganda and Campaigns on Traditional Media
Traditional communication channels like newspapers, radio, and TV changed how political
campaigns have been organized and how campaign money has been spent to use those
platforms most efficiently. In the introduction, we provide some examples from US politics,
but these observations are applicable to most countries. Here we will delve into campaign
strategies adopted on traditional media channels.
Advertisement has a significant role in reaching voters and the goal of a successful cam-
paign is to choose the right approach to win the election. The most successful campaigns
have the most memorable themes and visuals that help sway public opinion and win elec-
tions.
Persuasion is the main tool in traditional campaigns. All forms of the campaign (posters,
TV ads., etc.) are the products of carefully engineered themes and messages. How public
opinion is created and shaped in advertisement campaigns is explained by Edward Bernays
in his seminal work “Crystallizing public opinion” with various examples [32].
Earlier engineered persuasion campaigns used printed media such as posters and news-
paper advertisements to reach targeted audiences. Common themes in these posters are
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depicting an enemy as evil or portraying yourself to look righteous [194]. Some of the
most memorable posters target different personal traits and moral foundations as well (see
Fig. 2.1). For instance, the “I Want You” poster presents Uncle Sam as a way to manifest
patriotic emotion, which is used to recruit soldiers for both first and second world wars.
A similar example of recruitment propaganda is released by the British government during
WWI, which shows a daughter posing a question to her father, “Daddy, what did YOU do
in the Great War?”. This poster is trying to manipulate an able man with guilt associated
with not volunteering for wartime service. “We Can Do It!” is another wartime propaganda
used to boost worker morale during WWII that later became popular to promote feminism
and other political issues [152, 256]. An example of a poster that demonizes the enemy is
presented in Fig. 2.1.
Perhaps not surprisingly, we observe an increase in comic book sales during interna-
tional conflicts [212]. Comic books are predominantly used as propaganda tools by using
visual cues to present cultural ideas embodied in flesh-and-blood characters. Ideas about
nationalism, societal stability, and feminism were best presented by Superman, Batman,
and Wonderwoman respectively [64].
Themes and motives used in television advertisements show common parallels with the
propaganda posters used during the Second World War. An analysis of over 800 TV adver-
tising spots between 1960 and 1988 shows that negativity in advertisements mostly appeals
to voters’ fears [163]. We observe shared components such as triggering fear and emotions,
nationalism, and demonizing the enemy. Tony Schwartz, a media consultant, created two
of the most memorable election advertisements in US politics. “Daisy” spot were aired only
once in 1964, but later replayed several times in other news outlets because of its emotional
impact. In this short clip, the association between a countdown for the atomic bomb and a
young girl counting daisy petals triggers emotional response and fear.
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Using the power of television, politicians reach out to larger crowds and drive their
attention as they choose [30,102,106,149]. Advertisements play the important role of putting
the “typical citizen” on the spot and setting norms and important questions. Politicians use
advertisement to make an effective campaign by either supporting their own campaigns or
attacking the policies of their opponents [24, 259]. One of the first examples of this effort
was known as the “Eisenhower answers America” campaign, where the President answered
question recorded in a studio that contained important messages for his campaign.
Similarly, advertisements also use celebrities who have an influence on people. Creating
associations between admired celebrities with certain ideologies is another strategy used in
political campaigns. McAllister discussed personalization of politicians and how political
priming works through television [196].
Persuasion is a broad term that covers different types of influence. We talked about how
advertising is used to influence political beliefs. However, influence through advertisement
is not the only type that affects and changes belief systems [72]. Most engineered persuasion
campaigns contain a certain level of misinformation [258]. Fake news and conspiracy theories
are examples of such campaigns.
Since ancient Greek times, rhetoric and elocution have been recognized as the highest
standard for a successful politician. Aristotle’s rhetoric describes three main mechanisms for
persuasion: ethos, pathos, and logos [13]. Ethos is an appeal to an authority or credibility
of the presenter. If a presenter has credibility and shares certain moral values, these moral
values can be used to support message. Examples of such campaign were common during
cigarette advertisements that used actors dressed as doctors mislead audiences. Pathos is
an important component, which appeals to the emotions of audience. Pathos might use
not only positive emotions like hope and gratitude but also negative emotions like fear and
threats. Lastly, logos is the logical appeal or the simulation of it. It is commonly used with
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facts and figures to support claims by the presenter. It is commonly used together with
ethos.
Most persuasion campaigns use strategies that present content along with conflicted
facts and distorted claims by authorities [78, 312]. Conspiracy theories are one of the most
extreme but persistent examples of misinformation. They appeal to the psychological urge to
explain that mysterious things happen for a reason [132,268]. Successful conspiracy theories
emerge from a group of supporters, who believe in the sinister aims of higher entities such
as governments, religious groups or even extraterrestrial life forms [141].
Censorship is a practice to repress dissemination of the truth. Historically, we observed
practices like collecting printed media, preventing the release of movies or manipulating
pictures or news to hide facts. Censorship of various newspapers was protested by printing
censored content in blank [80]. Examples of such counter-censorship tactics can be seen
in French, Australian, and Palestinian media. Nazis and Stalin collected books and other
printed media and burned them during political repressions [134]. Such practices inspired
dystopian novels like Fahrenheit 451 [49].
2.2 Social Media: Microscope for World
2.2.1 Memes and Trends
The meme concept was first proposed by Richard Dawkins in his influential book “The
Selfish Gene" [95]. Dawkins defines the meme as “a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit
of imitation". Nowadays we have adopted this concept to represent hashtags, keywords, and
URLs on the internet.
Tracking and grouping similar concepts is easier when they are presented as quantifiable
units. Memes serve this purpose. Most of the studies that analyze the content generated
online isolate memes as starting points for their initial datasets.
14
There has been a large body of work in the area of information diffusion through net-
works. Several early models for information diffusion were inspired from classical disease
propagation models in epidemiology, such as SIR and SIS [16]. There has also been exten-
sive work on modeling the adoption or spread of an idea, content or product in a social
network. Well known classes of models in this domain include Threshold [142] and Cascade
models [135], that specify how a node adopts a particular idea or product based on the
adoption pattern prevalent in its neighborhood. The concept of diffusion was initially intro-
duced by social scientists and theory was developed to study how innovations and novelties
spread [244]. Studies also define different categories for adopters such as innovators, early
adopters, majority, and laggards based on their rank in involvement. Other related diffusion
models for product marketing included the Bass [22] model that is based on an S-shaped
adoption curve [122].
In recent work, Goel et.al proposes a formal measure, structural virality, of the degree
to which a cascade reaches its audience through broadcast-like mechanisms vs. viral mecha-
nisms [131]. The authors conduct a large scale empirical study of a billion diffusion events for
news, videos, images and petitions on Twitter and observe a wide range of diverse cascading
structures with varying structural virality, and show a low correlation between popularity
and structural virality. The authors then show how a simple SIR model can capture several
of the empirically-observed properties of the cascades. However, they note that their model
could not explain the large variance in structural virality that they observed empirically.
Trends represent interesting collective communication phenomena: they are user-generated,
continually changing and mostly ungoverned (although orchestrated hijacking attempts have
been observed [52,240,241]). Different information diffusion mechanisms may determine the
trending dynamics of hashtags and other memes on social media. Exogenous and endogenous
dynamics produce memes with distinctive characteristics [116, 119, 181, 216, 263]: external
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events occurring in the real world (e.g., a natural disaster or a terrorist attack) can generate
chatter on the platform and therefore trigger the trending of a new, unforeseen hashtag;
other topics (e.g., politics or entertainment) are continuously discussed and sometimes a
particular conversation can garner lots of attention and generate trending memes. So far,
trends have been studied as a proxy to detect exogenous real-world events discussed in social
media [5,23,87,246], emerging topics, or news of interest for the online community [60,183].
Recent work analyzes emerging topics, memes, and conversations triggered by real world
events [5,23,60]. Studies of information dissemination reveal mechanisms governing content
production and consumption [73] as well as prediction of future content popularity. Cheng et
al. study the prediction of photo-sharing cascade size [65] and recurrence [66] on Facebook.
2.2.2 Geography of Information Diffusion
It has been suggested that social media may overcome the spatio-temporal limitations of
traditional communication: technologically-mediated systems make it possible to ignore
physical and geographic distances [75, 217]. This, however, does not imply that commu-
nication patterns on social media are not affected by physical distances and geographic
borders [209,227].
Trends are also strongly localized in space and time: the temporal and geographic di-
mensions play a crucial role to determine the success of a trend in terms of spreading
and longevity. Unveiling the spatio-temporal dynamics that drive trending conversations
on social media is instrumental for many purposes: from designing successful advertising
campaigns, to understanding virality and popularity that characterize some topics. Recent
studies took advantage of platforms such as Yelp and Foursquare, which provide customized
services to their users based on their physical location (e.g., recommendations of events or
places), to study geographic user activity patterns [221, 247–249]. Others have used plat-
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forms such as Twitter and Facebook, that enrich user profiles with geographic information
and accompany user generated content with location-based data, to map user demograph-
ics [174,206].
Onnela et al. [227] noted that, although the probability of observing a tie between two
individuals in a social network (in that case, a mobile phone call network) decreases as a
power law with physical distance, the geographic spread of social groups quickly increases
with the size of the group; even groups of modest dimensions (≈ 30 members) are able to
span hundreds of kilometers, suggesting that, in technologically-mediated social systems,
there exist distinctive social dynamics that govern the communication among individuals.
Geographic locations and physical distances have been found to be correlated to friendship
behaviors in online social networks [187], to determine patterns in human mobility networks
[51,137], and to affect collaboration schemes in science networks [228].
Geographic factors have also been recently found to be crucial in the adoption of lan-
guages and dialects [209], and in the expression of sentiment [207, 236, 237] in online social
media. Mocanu et al. [209] showed how social media data can be used to characterize lan-
guage geography at different levels of granularity, to highlight patterns such as linguistic
homogeneity and linguistic mixture in multilingual regions.
2.2.3 Proxy to Analyze Human Behaviors
Studies by Mitchell et al. suggests that the adoption of online social media content can
be instrumental to describe emotional, demographic, and geographic characteristics of users
of these socio-technical systems; in particular, they investigated Twitter users active in
the US in terms of happiness and individual satisfaction [125,207]. A study of happiness on
Twitter led to a hedonometer project, in which the authors study temporal changes of global
happiness and the relation between local low and high points with real-world events [107].
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People use social media to reflect their emotions and events affecting their lives through
social media. The mismatch between the social representation and real state of the user
can pose challenges for research that leverages social media data because many individual
worries about their online representations and conform online norms [109, 151]. However,
our behaviors on social networks still carry a lot of information about personality, cultural,
political and sexual preferences [133,238,239].
The use of social media also shows strong correlation with public health measures [98,
230]. Researchers have been studying several health related topics using social media
data [85,96,97,99,225,226] and search logs [229,231,301].
Similarly, services for online shopping have rich information about our preferences and
tastes. We use health monitoring devices to track our work-out routines and sleep qual-
ity [143, 200]. Location based services like Foursquare, AirBnB and Yelp track our eating
habits and navigation history [1, 167,201,257].
2.2.4 Detection of Emerging Topics
Another recent research line related to our work is that of the detection of emerging trends,
topics, memes, and events in online social networks and social media [5, 23, 60, 87, 114, 183,
195,246].
Social media data can be used to make educated guesses on the outcome of real-word
events, such as elections or competitions [104]. Ciulla et al. [75] combined trends and
geographic information of Twitter data to demonstrate that online social media can be
exploited to predict social events in the real-world. They collected trending hashtags and
phrases related to contestants of the popular TV show American Idol, mapping the fan
base of each candidate to different geographic regions inside and outside the US, to identify
spatial patterns in attention allocation and preferences expressed on the online platform.
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These signals were then combined and used to predict voting behaviors of fans achieving
good accuracy.
2.3 Social Media: Online Discourse Platform
Technologically mediated communication systems, like social media platforms and online
social networks, support information sharing and foster the connectivity of hundreds of
millions of users across the world every day [48, 288]. The adoption of these platforms has
been associated with profound changes in 21st-century society: they affect how we produce
and consume information [11,44,218], shifting the paradigm from a broadcasting model (one-
to-many, like radio and TV) to a peer-to-peer (many-to-many) distribution system. They
have also altered the ways we seek information to understand societal events surrounding
us [203,204], and how we interact with our peers [61,62].
People participate in social media for many different reasons. Some join social media
with the intention to socialize with friends or to meet new people. Others participate to
promote a cause, or to gain fame as an authority or expert in their topics of interest. Much
prior research has documented the many reasons why people choose to participate on social
networks, such as communicating with real-world friends or making new contacts [162,177],
connecting with colleagues and building professional relationships [105,168], and connecting
with users that act as information providers [158].
2.3.1 Social Media Use During Protest
Ease of access to online services creates opportunities to freely discuss and share opinions and
to debate different points of view. Political discussions are the most influential for individuals
and consequential for society. Recently, researchers have been studying political uprisings
and social protest around the world using data collected from various online platforms.
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Examples of social protests and movements that have used social mobilization include the
revolution in Egypt [68], the anti-capitalist Occupy Wall Street movement [56,67,83,84,101],
and social upheavals in Spain [45,139] and Turkey [53,155,224,284]. The benefits resulting
from the adoption of social media include lowered barriers to participation, increased ease
with which small-scale acts can be aggregated, the rapid propagation of logistic information
and narrative frames, and a heightened sense of community and collective identity [28,
29, 214, 279, 307]. These events provide evidence of the impact of social media and their
importance for free speech. Protecting these resources from disruption is important for the
continuous free flow of information in society.
Social media have played a pivotal role in the development and increasing frequency
of social movements [28, 128, 214]. Using survey methodology, Tufekci and Wilson [271]
found that the use of social media in the Egyptian protests allowed people to make informed
decisions about participation in the movement, provided new sources of information outside
of the regime’s control, and increased the odds that people participated in the protests
on the first day. Another survey found Facebook use for news and socializing in Chile’s
youth movement to be positively associated with participation in the protests [278]. Chief
among social platforms used for protests is Twitter that, with more than a half billion users,
provides a high-visibility window on real-world events and an active forum for discussion
of political and social issues. The mostly ungoverned nature of this platform ensures a
democratic, peer-to-peer discussion, aiming at both creating a framing language to set goals
for the protest, and as a vehicle for mobilizing resources and social capital to sustain it
[3,83,153,190]. Individuals and organizations can discuss and share information on Twitter
about the movement’s political and social objectives [26, 27]. They can also coordinate to
marshal the resources needed to carry out on-the-ground activities like encampments or
marches [159,198].
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González-Bailón et al. [139] collected a large corpus of tweets related to the Spanish so-
cial and economic ‘Indignados’ protest that unfolded during May 2011. Their work provides
evidence that Twitter played a role in the recruitment of new individuals to the protest
movement as well as in the dissemination of information related to mass mobilization activ-
ities.
Choudhary et al. [68] analyzed the aggregate tweet sentiment during the 2011 Egyp-
tian revolution, observing that fluctuations in positive and negative sentiment were closely
correlated with the sentiment expressed by influential users worldwide. The authors also
observed that users tweeting about the Egyptian revolution were distributed both inside and
outside Egypt. Baños et al. [20, 21] highlighted the role of social media users in the diffu-
sion of information related to mass political mobilizations, unveiling the presence of hidden
influentials who foster large cascades. The authors also observed how the topology of the
communication network during such events reflects underlying dynamics like information
diffusion and group emergence.
In a study of the Occupy Wall Street uprising, Conover et al. focused on the geospatial
characteristic of the protest [83]. They observed that highly-localized discussions mirrored
individual attempts to organize and coordinate mobilization on the ground. Interstate dis-
cussion channels driving long-distance communications fostered the collective framing pro-
cess that imbues social movements with a shared language, purpose and identity. A lon-
gitudinal analysis [84] revealed that users did not change their connectivity, interests and
attention patterns with respect to baseline activity prior to the beginning of the protest.
These findings left open the question whether Occupy had any long-lasting effect on its
online community of participants.
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2.3.2 Censorship
In some societies, governments have responded to the growing phenomenon of political
mobilization by either terminating access to the online services or developing laws to restrict
the exchange of information [313]. China, Iran, North Korea, and Turkey are examples of
countries applying internet censorship widely. These countries are monitoring social media
and news to control online discourse. If discussions turn to sensitive topics, concerned
governments intervene and attempt to control information dissemination [7, 170].
Platforms like Facebook and Twitter have been censored by limiting internet access at the
country level. Social media companies have recently created specialized legal departments
to address requests from governments and provide continuous service for their users in
censored countries. Periodical transparency reports are released by technology companies
like Facebook,1 Twitter,2 Microsoft,3 and Google.4 These reports contain the statistics of
requests received from different governments and disclosures of information released. The
increasing trend in government requests for disclosure of user information and censorship
requests are worrisome.
Many censorship regulations are developed to control or limit dissemination of political
discussions. A recent study highlights a significant rate of content removal on Weibo [19].
When compared to the volume of politically relevant keywords, the authors estimated that
16% of political posts were deleted by authorities on Weibo. The content analysis of cen-
sorship on Weibo points to the discrepancy between the Chinese Communist Party and the
oppositions [289]. The lag time between content creation and censorship indicates a distinc-
tion between relevant and dangerous topics from the viewpoint of Chinese censorship. The
political impact of micro-blogging platforms is analyzed by comparing Twitter and Weibo
1govtrequests.facebook.com
2transparency.twitter.com
3microsoft.com/en-us/about/corporate-responsibility/reports-hub
4google.com/transparencyreport
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use in China [267].
In another analysis of Weibo, researchers studied the mechanism of Weibo’s trending
topic detection system to track sensitive viral discussions [315]. The authors also showed
the mechanism behind filtering by tracking sensitive users [316]. They found that the trend
of a viral topic is short-lived, which points to the effectiveness of Weibo’s censorship on
sensitive topics. We also observed a small but significant decrease in median censorship
time. On Twitter, censorship requires legal documents and process time unlike Chinese
social media, which has centralized control of censorship.
Technical challenges against censorship can be supported by using technologies like VPN
services or TOR project.5 Researchers also built services to quantitatively measure the
censorship problem [54] and analyzed examples of country-wide Internet outages [88,287].
2.4 Social Media: Medium for Abuse
Through social media platforms, we are exposed to a tremendous amount of information.
Still, we have been facing a significant problems of misinformation [113] and trapping in-
side an echochambers [2, 82]. Some governments are also taking precautions by applying
censorship to the Internet, which eventually terminates users’ right to access information.
2.4.1 Misinformation and Manipulation
Individuals and their opinions are increasingly influenced by information spreading on social
media. Twitter, among others, conveys hundreds of million messages per day and plays a
crucial role in the timely diffusion of news and information. Examples of Twitter conversa-
tion topics include coordinated social mobilization [84,139] and political debates [44]. Social
media content is mostly ungoverned and therefore it can be manipulated. This often results
5torproject.org
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Figure 2.2: Persuasion defined according to the mode of propagation and the entities behind
it.
in the diffusion of spam, misinformation, rumors, and deceptive messages [176,235]. Persua-
sion campaigns and other types of engineered social media conversations aim at challenging
or changing reader beliefs, opinions, or ideas. The appearance of an organic movement can
be created variations of the original message. Artificial means like social bots or fake ac-
counts can be used to rebroadcast such variants [154]. When a deceptive message produced
this way is believed to be genuine by real users, it can spread virally and reach a large au-
dience [50]. Detecting engineered or artificially sustained communication in its early stage
is therefore of paramount importance to avoid deception at scale.
Figure 2.2 illustrates two dimensions along which we can distinguish between different
classes of conversation observable on social media: the mode of information diffusion and
the entities behind the conversation.
Persuasion campaigns can be enacted by promoting content, typically by advertising.
This way the content will have higher visibility and reach. This is in contrast to organic
diffusion, which stems from spontaneous collective attention toward a topic. Persuasion
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can also occur by employing artificial agents using fake or compromised accounts, including
social bots, to give the impression that real people are paying attention to a topic or person.
Based on these two dimensions, we can identify three classes of persuasion campaigns, each
distinct from grassroots conversations.
Astroturf is a peculiar form of persuasion often observed in social media in the context
of politics and social mobilization [241]. It aims at simulating a grassroots conversation
through an orchestrated effort. The entity who attempts to generate such orchestrated
campaigns generally exploits fake accounts or social bots [154, 290]. These artificial means
allow the generation of a large volume of content and simulate the online activity of real
users. Cases of massive astroturf campaigns have been observed during political races such
as the US senate [213] and presidential elections [204].
The use of advertising is possibly the most common form of persuasion in social media.
The intent to promote is transparent. This method aims at attracting attention toward a
given entity (e.g., a brand). Advertising campaigns are an ideal use-case for our study, since
promoted content is clearly labeled as such on Twitter.
Complex persuasion campaigns employ a mix of the patterns discussed above. Com-
plex campaigns might exhibit a mixture of promoted and organic content. Conversations
that start as promoted might pick up audience attention and mutate into organic topics
of discussion. Alternatively, the spark to initiate a conversation might occur naturally and
later involve social bots that engage in the discussion. Complex persuasion campaigns may
have large societal impact if not detected early: successful campaigns can affect users by the
thousands.
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2.4.2 Social Bots
As opposed to social media accounts controlled by humans, bots are controlled by software,
algorithmically generating content and establishing interactions. While not all social bots
are harmful, there is a growing record of malicious applications of social bots. Some emulate
human behavior to manufacture fake grassroots political support [35,240], promote terrorist
propaganda and recruitment [31, 118], manipulate the stock market [113], and disseminate
rumors and conspiracy theories [34].
Discussion of social bot activity, the broader implications on the social network, and
the detection of these accounts are becoming central research avenues [46, 113, 115, 180].
The magnitude of the problem is underscored by a social bot detection challenge recently
organized by DARPA to study information dissemination mediated by automated accounts
and to detect malicious activities carried out by these bots [266].
Also known as sybil accounts, social bots can pollute online discussion by lending
false credibility to their messages and influence other users [6]. A recent study shows to
what extent automated systems produce content and dominate discussions about electronic
cigarettes on Twitter [76]. Social bots also vary greatly in terms of their behavior, intent,
and vulnerabilities. A recent study proposed a categorization scheme for bot attacks on
social network [208].
Most of the previous work on detecting bot accounts has operated from the perspective
of the social network platform operators, i.e., with full access to all data. These techniques
focus on large-scale data to either cluster behavioral patterns of users [292] or classify ac-
counts using supervised learning techniques [180,311]. For instance Beutel et al. decomposed
event data in time, user, and activity dimensions to extract similar behaviors [37]. These
techniques are useful to identify coordinated large-scale attacks directed at a common set
of targets at the same time, but accounts with similar strategies might also target different
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groups and operate separately from each other.
An alternative approach to study social bots and sybil attacks is to understand what
makes certain groups and individuals more appealing as targets. Wald et al. studied the
factors affecting the likelihood of a users being targeted by social bots [291]. This approach
points to effective strategies that future social bots might develop.
Structural connectivity may provide important cues. However, Yang et al. studied
large-scale sybil attacks and observed sophisticated sybils that develop strategies for build-
ing normal-looking social ties, making themselves harder to detect [311]. Some sybil attacks
analyze the social graph of targeted groups to infiltrate specific organizations [110]. Sybil-
Rank is a system developed to identify attacks from their underlying topology [57]. Alvisi
et al. survey the evolution of sybil defense protocols that leverage the structural properties
of the social graph [10].
Social bot detection tools use learning models trained with data collected from human
and bot accounts. Chu et al. built a classification system identifying accounts controlled
by humans, bots, and cyborg accounts [69, 70]. Wang et al. analyzed sybil attacks using
annotations by experts and crowd-sourcing workers to evaluate consistency and effectiveness
of different detection systems [293]. Clark et al. labeled 1,000 accounts by hand and found
natural language text features to be very effective at discriminating between human and
automated accounts [77]. Lee et al. used a honeypot approach to collect the largest sample
of bot accounts available to date [180].
2.4.3 Fake News
The term fake news is not new, but the prevalence of fake news in social media introduce
serious problems. Fake news websites deliberately publish hoaxes, propaganda, and misin-
formation pretending to be legitimate news sources. Unlike satirical news, they often aim
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to mislead readers in exchange for political and financial gain.
A large amount of misinformation spreads online and its prevalence and persuasiveness
can affect serious decisions around vaccination [55, 166, 223], elections [8] and stock market
behavior [58, 179] among other issues. A recent study suggests that misinformation is just
as likely to go viral as reliable information [254]. Dissemination of fake news is promoted
by copycat websites. Once an untrustworthy source releases some content online, those
copycat websites duplicate the original content. Corrections on the original source are no
more relevant and useful since many other media outlets are already affected. We can make
an analogy between dissemination of fake news through multiple media outlets to a disease
spreading in groups.
Recent research efforts focus on modeling the diffusion of misinformation [34, 36, 100,
127, 160]. Algorithmic efforts for detecting rumors and misinformation are also crucial to
prevent the spread of campaigns with malicious intents [117,205,235,242].
To hinder the dissemination of fake news, both journalists and readers have great respon-
sibilities. Online websites like FactCheck6, PolitiFact7, and Snopes8 provide fact-checking
services to debunk fake news. Fact-checking provided by online services influences opinions
of voters and provides a guide to politicians in judging what news might be fake before dis-
seminating them [126,222]. To automate fact-checking, researchers are working on designing
systems that can evaluate the credibility and truthfulness of claims [74,309].
The problem with fake news can be partially resolved by educating Internet users. News
literacy is important and everyone should learn how to detect fake news. Recently, we
have been observing a growing community of fact-checkers. Poynter is one of these orga-
nizations, which has released “International Fact-Checking Network fact-checkers’ code of
6factcheck.org
7politifact.com
8snopes.com
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principles”9 to promote excellence in fact-checking. Another noteworthy example is First
draft.10 These organizations not only provide fact-checked information about popular claims
but also monitor political campaigns and elections. Collaboration between different fact-
checking organizations is promoted by proposing an integrated system to share fact-checking
information.
2.5 Perspective for Designing Better Systems
The influence of external factors on the US presidential election in 2016 was a controversial
topic. Recent research shows evidence supporting the involvement of social bots in political
discourse [35]. Bessi et al. estimate nearly 15% of the accounts and 20% of the tweets having
involvement by social bots from both sides of the political spectrum. The participation of
social bots in political conversations does not necessarily need to be sophisticated. Social
bots are also known as disrupting conversations by flooding content to a particular conversa-
tion channel. The pollution of conversation on social media makes it intractable for humans
looking for useful information. An example of such channel disruptions was observed in
Mexico recently [265], where different hastags are flooded by social bots and force people to
move discussion to alternative channels.
Through social media and anonymity, targeted attacks are possible in orchestrating a
large army of social bots, trolls [199] and bullies [25, 243]. Examples of extremist activities
on social media have alarmingly increased and many platforms take precautions for early-
detection and prevention of such activities. Recent studies also point to social media use for
recruitment to terrorist organizations on social media [31,118,193].
We have been observing the societal impact of fake news. An increasing number of online
news websites and social networks are producing implausible content. The production of
9poynter.org/fact-checkers-code-of-principles/
10firstdraftnews.com
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fake news has been increasing, but the major problem is the consumption of fake news
articles. It is valuable to understand the roots of the problem before proposing solutions.
Herbert Simon’s work on attention economy might explain some of our mental shortcuts;
we tend to believe a content based on our opinions about our friend who shared the content.
Confirmation bias is considered one of the factors [220]. According to this hypothesis, people
tend to believe and seek information supporting their initial opinions. However, people tend
to believe nonpartisan opinions.
Traditionally people access credible information through legitimate sources. However, in
the Internet age, popular users have a stronger influence on widely consumed information
sources. Most of the news articles follow a journey starting from their original source to
copycat websites, social media accounts, and finally to their readers. These long chains
of content cause some problems, for instance corrections made on original articles rarely
propagates to the latest venue. News consumers are also not aware of the original source.
Researchers studied when readers pay attention to the source of content [165]. They found
that users tend to believe the content considering only the source from which they obtained
news unless the subject is really important to them. This problem can be solved by focusing
on news literacy. When educated online users can access fact-checking tools, it is possible
to stop fake-news.
There are significant efforts to preserve the social ecosystem. Researchers develop tools
like BotOrNot11 [94, 282] to detect social bots on Twitter, Hoaxy12 [254] to study dissem-
ination of fake news, and TweetCred13 [145] to evaluate credibility of tweet content. The
Jigsaw lab of Alphabet has also devoted significant efforts to tackle some of the global
security challenges.14 They design systems and tools to prevent censorship and online ha-
11truthy.indiana.edu/botornot
12hoaxy.iuni.iu.edu
13twitdigest.iiitd.edu.in/TweetCred
14jigsaw.google.com
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rassment. Considering the impact of technology on the dissemination of misinformation, we
share a great responsibility to work together. Computer scientists, social scientists, jour-
nalists and industry partners must collaborate to implement policies and systems against
online threats.
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CHAPTER 3
Concepts and Methods
“ Give me a place to stand and with a lever I will move the whole world. ”Archimedes,
3.1 Twitter Data
This dissertation presents studies that use datasets collected from Twitter. In our lab,
we have elevated access through Twitter Streaming API,1 which approximately includes a
sample of 10% of the public tweets. Our lab also built a service, called OSoMe, to share
derived data with researchers and citizen scientists [93].
Twitter is a popular micro-blogging platform that is available to millions of people all over
the world. Users can interact by creating social ties (friend/follower relations), retweeting
content of others to disseminate content among their followers, and mentioning other users
(using @ sign before a username, for instance, @onurvarol) in their posts. Twitter users
can post up to 140 characters per tweet including URLs for external media content, such as
pictures and videos, alongside text. Hashtags — keywords preceded by # sign — included
in tweets are used as keywords to summarize a discussion topic or to convey a message in a
shortened format.
1http://dev.twitter.com/docs/streaming-apis
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Figure 3.1: JSON hierarchy of tweet and user objects.
Twitter has a rich API to provide access information about local and global trends, user
social network, and several other meta-data as shown in Fig. 3.1. Some of this additional
information has been used in this dissertation such as trending topics for studying the spa-
tiotemporal nature of information diffusion and withheld tweets for analysis of censorship on
Twitter. Censored tweets contain the fields [withheld_scope] and [withheld_in_countries]
to indicate how content is censored and where censorship is active.
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Figure 3.2: Relation between users through friendship or information flow. Posts produced
during the process can be related to each other through co-occurrence or topical relevance.
3.1.1 Information Mining
Using data available on Twitter, we can extract information about the temporal evolution
of user properties such as number of friends, followers, and tweets posted. We can also
construct relationships between those users through retweet and mention ties. In terms of
conversations, we can construct co-occurrences of hashtags and compute volume of activity.
All this information, depicted in Fig. 3.2, can be extracted from a collection of tweets, which
are essential to build systems described in this dissertation.
In the case of social protest or topically focused events, we can collect data through
the Twitter Streaming API by keywords of interests. Users on Twitter adopt hashtags to
promote communication about the events. For instance during the Gezi movement the
#direngezi hashtag was used commonly. We collected live stream during events to learn
other relevant keywords to expand our set of hashtags. Tweets that contained these hashtags
were later collected from our 10% stream.
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3.1.2 Feature Extraction
Using the information obtained from tweets, we can extract several features in different
categories: network structure and information diffusion, language and sentiment, temporal,
and user meta-data. Systems described in this dissertation use subsets of these features
collected separately for each user or campaign.
3.1.2.1 Network
Twitter actively fosters interconnectivity. Users are linked by means of follower/followee
relations. Content travels from person to person via retweets. Tweets themselves can be
addressed to specific users via mentions. The network structure carries crucial information
for the characterization of different types of communication. In fact, the usage of network
features significantly helps in tasks like astroturf detection [240]. Structure and modularity
of networks are also shown to be useful to maximize information dissemination [219]. We can
construct three types of networks: (i) retweet, (ii) mention, and (iii) hashtag co-occurrence
networks.
Retweet and mention networks have users as nodes, with a directed link between a pair
of users that follows the direction of information spreading — toward the user retweeting
or being mentioned. In tweet meta-data, information about the user posting the tweet is
presented in the [user] field. If a tweet is retweeted, the original tweet is preserved in
the [retweeted_status] field. In case of mentions and replies, tweets pointed to users can
be accessed via using [entitites][user_mentions] and [in_reply_to_user_id] respec-
tively.
The hashtag co-occurrence network has undirected links between hashtag nodes when
two hashtags have occurred together in a tweet. In each tweet, the [entities][hashtags]
field contains hashtags used in the tweet.
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All networks are weighted according to the number of interactions and co-occurrences.
Using these networks, several network statistics such as the number of nodes and edges,
density, and average clustering coefficient, can be computed. Node-specific properties such
as strength, clustering coefficient, and centrality measures can be studied through their
distributions.
3.1.2.2 Language and Sentiment
Many recent papers have demonstrated the importance of content and language features
in revealing the nature of social media conversations [47, 90, 184, 197, 209]. Textual infor-
mation in the tweet is located in the [text] field. Users can also provide some free-text
content about themselves such as a description and location in the [user][description]
and [user][location] fields, respectively.
From the tweet texts, we extract language features by applying the Part-of-Speech (POS)
tagging techniques using the NLTK package [39], which identifies different types of natural
language components. Additional language and content features such as length of the text,
number of words, URLs, mentions, and hashtags can be extracted from a tweet. User
language is also available in the [lang] field by ISO language codes.
Sentiment analysis is a powerful tool to automatically describe the attitude or mood
of an online conversation. We adopt several sentiment extraction techniques to generate
various sentiment features, including happiness score [172], arousal, valence and dominance
scores [295], polarization and strength [305], and emoticon score [4].
3.1.2.3 User Meta-data
User meta-data is crucial to classify communication patterns in social media [115,206]. In a
tweet the [user] field contains information about a user such as number of friends, followers,
and posts, profile image, profile description, user language, and time-zone. Temporal changes
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of the friend, follower, and post counts provide valuable information about user behaviors.
3.1.2.4 Temporal
The temporal dimension associated with the production and consumption of content may
reveal important information about campaigns and their evolution [129]. Each tweet contains
meta-data about creation time of the tweet and user account in the [created_at] and
[user][created_at] fields respectively. The most basic time-related feature that can be
considered is the number of tweets produced in a given time interval. Inter-event time
distributions also carry important signals about the progression of events.
3.2 Graph Theory
The structure of a network is commonly depicted as a graph. A graph consists of mainly
two sets of objects: nodes (N = {n1, · · · , nN}) and edges (E = {eij |i, j ∈ V }). Each edge
is represented as a pair of nodes and directionality is important if the graph is directed.
Connectivity of the graph can also be represented as an adjacency matrix A, in which each
element of the matrix Aij represents the weight of an edge between nodes ni and nj . For
instance a graph representation in Fig. 3.3 has 6 nodes and 9 directed edges. I use this
toy-example to describe some of the important network measures below.
Degree: A number of edges connected to a node represents the degree. In directed
networks, incoming and outgoing edges differ and one denoted as in- and out-degree. For
instance node-3 in the network in Fig. 3.3 has in-degree 1 and out-degree 2.
Weight: The weight of an edge represents importance or strength of relation between
nodes. The weight of the edge eij can be represented as wij . For instance in the toy-network
the weight of the edge e31 is w31 = 5.
Strength: It is the sum of the weights of all edges adjacent to a node ni. The strength
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Figure 3.3: Example representation of a graph consisting of 6 nodes and 9 directed edges.
Node-3 is highlighted to provide examples in definitions.
of node can be denoted as in- and out-strength if the network is directed. For instance the
in-strength of node-3 is 1 and the out-strength is equal to 8.
Density: The density of a graph represents the fraction of edges that exist in the graphs
compared to the maximum possible number of edges. Complete graphs have a density 1 and
our example graph has density 0.3. For directed graphs the density is computed as follow:
d =
|E|
|V | (|V | − 1)
Clustering coefficient: It is a measure of the degree to which nodes in a graph tend
to cluster together. There are two versions of this measure: global and local clustering
coefficients. The global clustering coefficient is the average of the local clustering coefficients
across all nodes in the network. Local clustering coefficient computes how close a node’s
neighbors are to being a clique for each node. For instance, in our toy-network node-3 has
3 neighbors. Among node-3’s neighbors, 2 out of 3 possible edges are realized, which yields
0.66 clustering coefficient for node-3.
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3.3 Machine Learning Methods
Every second of our lives, we observe the world and make assumptions and predictions
about our environment. When these subsequent events and observations are recorded, we
can also automatize these processes. We approximate the processes that explain the data by
constructing models. These models might not be able to describe processes completely, but
they might be useful and accountable to detect certain patterns and regularities. Machine
learning explores such methods and techniques that can learn from and make predictions
on data.
Techniques employed in machine learning tasks are typically classified into three broad
categories: supervised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised [9]. In this dissertation, we com-
monly used supervised techniques to classify and detect particular patterns in the data and
unsupervised techniques to explore and identify instances with high similarities.
In the following, I will describe off-the-shelf methods and evaluation techniques used in
different part of this dissertation. The Python library Scikit-learn is used to apply most of
these methods [232].
3.3.1 Supervised Learning
In supervised learning problems, data are presented in a form of a set of features extracted
from the dataset and a corresponding label. Given a set of N training examples of the form
{(x1, y1), · · · , (xN , yN )}, xi is a feature vector of the i-th example and yi is its label. A
learning algorithm seeks to find a function that maps the input space X onto the output
space Y . In terms of binary classification, relationships between features of the training
dataset are learned to map any instances of the test examples to a binary value {0, 1} as
predicted label.
Random forest is the most commonly used technique for classification and regression
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tasks in this dissertation. Using a random subset of training data and a bagging mechanism
(random selection of feature subset) several decision trees are constructed by algorithm [150].
Classification decision for a test instance relies on voting between generated decision trees.
3.3.2 Unsupervised Learning
Unsupervised learning aims to infer a function that describes hidden structure from un-
labeled datasets. Clustering is one of the most common approaches to describe features
presented in the data, by grouping data points with relates characteristics.
The hierarchical clustering method, which uses agglomerative clustering, is a commonly
used unsupervised technique in this work. Agglomerative hierarchical clustering uses a
“bottom-up” approach: each observation starts in its own cluster, and pairs of similar clusters
are merged as one moves up the hierarchy. The resulting clustering of the data is usually
presented in a dendrogram.
3.3.3 Evaluation Techniques
In most of the analysis with data, evaluation is a critical part of the experimentation. In
supervised learning, algorithms produce predicted labels P = {p1, p2, · · · , pN} for instances
in the dataset for testing against ground-truth labels Y = {y1, y2, · · · , yN}. To overfitting
noise in the training dataset, the classifier is evaluated using a scheme called cross validation.
This common practice requires splitting data into k different folds; classifiers are trained
using data in k− 1 folds and tested on the remaining fold; this process repeats k times until
each fold is used for testing. Average results of these k-fold are reported in the experiments.
The outcomes of any binary classification task can be presented in a 2x2 table called
confusion matrix. Columns and rows of this matrix represent numbers of items in predicted
and true conditions. Terms true positive (TP) and true negative (TN) represents when
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Correct
label
Predicted label
p n total
p′ True
Positive
False
Negative P
′
n′ False
Positive
True
Negative N
′
total P N
Table 3.1: Example confusion matrix representation.
predicted and true labels are matched (see Fig 3.1).
Using this confusion matrix representation, we can define measures to evaluate the per-
formance of the classifier. Some of the commonly used measures are:
Accuracy: Fraction of correctly labeled items among all test instances:
accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
Precision: Fraction of positive classifications that are correctly classified:
precision =
TP
TP + FP
Recall: Fraction of positive instances that are correctly classified:
recall =
TP
TP + FN
F1 score: Harmonic mean of precision of recall:
F1 =
2 · precision · recall
precision+ recall
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AUC: Area under the received Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a
measure of accuracy. ROC plots the true positive rate (TPR = TPTP+FN ) versus the false
positive rate (FPR = FPFP+TN ) at various threshold settings. A random-guess classifier
produces the diagonal line where TPR equals FPR, corresponding to a 50% AUC score.
Classifiers with higher AUC scores perform better and the perfect classifier in this setting
achieves a 100% AUC score. AUC is a good measure when the dataset has a class imbalance,
because AUC is not biased by this imbalance.
NMI: “Normalized Mutual Information” is a technique to evaluate the quality of cluster-
ing outcomes using an information theoretical approach [91]. It assumes the availability of
a ground truth that represents the correct clusters. Let A be the correct cluster assignment,
and suppose that it contains cA clusters. Let B be the output of a clustering algorithm
operating on the same data and producing cB clusters. We can define a cA × cB confusion
matrix N, whose rows correspond to the clusters in A and whose columns represent clusters
in B. Each entry Nij of this confusion matrix reports the number of elements of the correct
i-th cluster that happen to be assigned to the j-th cluster by the clustering algorithm. The
Normalized Mutual Information is defined as
NMI(A,B) =
−2
cA∑
i=1
cB∑
j=1
Nij log
(
NijN
Ni·N·j
)
cA∑
i=1
Ni· log
(
Ni·
N
)
+
cB∑
j=1
N·j log
(
N·j
N
)
where Ni· (resp., N·j) is the sum of the elements in the i-th row (resp., j-th column) of the
confusion matrix, and N is the sum of all elements of N. The output of this measure is
normalized between zero (when the clusters in the two solutions are totally independent),
and one (when they exactly coincide). Therefore, the higher the value of NMI, the better
the quality of the clusters found by the algorithm. NMI assumes non-overlapping clusters.
42
A variant of NMI, called LFK-NMI after its authors (Lancichinetti, Fortunato, Kertész) is
proposed to measure the quality of overlapping clusters [178].
3.4 Limitations of Tools and Data
Many research projects including the ones presented in this dissertation, have limitations
and biases introduced by data, methods or tools used for analysis. Some of these limitation
can be improved by using more sophisticated techniques, but others have more fundamental
roots. Researchers should always be aware of these limitations and interpret their results
considering the effects of these limitations. Here I discuss some short-comings of our dataset
and techniques.
3.4.1 Twitter Dataset
In this dissertation, we mainly used Twitter data collected from a public stream that corre-
sponds to a random sample of 10% of the public tweets. We also used the Twitter REST
API to crawl the most recent tweets produced by certain groups of users.
Limitations and biases of Twitter samples have been studied before [140]. Analysis of
different Twitter samples show that the search API over-represents the more central users.
Beside the level of activity, researcher should also consider to what extend the population
on Twitter represents the actual demographics of the population under study. A study
from 2014 shows that the Twitter population is a highly non-uniform sample of the US
population [206].
3.4.2 Annotations and Labeled Data
Supervised machine learning algorithms rely on ground-truth data to learn underlying pat-
terns. These labels can be obtained from existing systems or generated by observations.
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Human annotation tasks are required in different domains to create ground-truth or train-
ing labels. Examples of human-annotation task to create reliable labeled data can be found
in building lexicon for word-emotion associations [210], annotating named entities [121], de-
tecting objects on images and videos [264], and many other domains. In this dissertation,
we used human annotations to build labeled dataset of human and bot accounts on Twitter.
Crowdsourcing tasks consist of group of a human annotators performing the same or
similar tasks. A recent analysis addresses common misconceptions about crowdsourcing
tasks [14]. For instance the authors show that disagreement between annotators is not the
result of poor quality in the annotation task, but a signal about the difficulty of the task.
Agreement between annotators can be used not only to measure the quality of the performed
task, but also to identify instances with high disagreement to improve systems.
3.4.3 Methods
When researchers address a new problem, they first consider methods and techniques ap-
plicable to the problem. In most of the cases, these methods are the ones that researchers
are already familiar with. However, it is always important to know the advantages and
limitations of a methodology before implementing it to address a research question.
In this dissertation, we used methods to analyze emotions through off-the-shelf sentiment
analysis techniques. Most of these methods rely on lexicons to compute a score for a given
text. However, they are not sophisticated enough to identify sarcasm or negation. There
exist more sophisticated techniques to learn more nuanced details about the text. Recently,
deep learning and vector embedding techniques have become popular. They outperform
existing methods, but they have also their own limitations. Vector embeddings for instance,
have been shown to be biased on gender due to the nature of the training data [43].
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CHAPTER 4
Information Diffusion and Online Discourse
4.1 Diffusion of Trends
Trends represent interesting collective communication phenomena: they are user-generated,
continually changing and mostly ungoverned (although orchestrated hijacking attempts have
already been observed [52, 240, 241]). So far, trends have been studied as a proxy to detect
exogenous real-world events discussed in social media, [5, 23, 87, 246], emerging topics, or
news of interest for the online community [60,183].
But trends are also strongly localized in space and time: the temporal and geographic
dimensions play a crucial role to determine the success of a trend in terms of spreading
and longevity. We argue that unveiling the spatio-temporal dynamics that drive trending
conversations on social media is instrumental to many purposes: from designing successful
advertising campaigns, to understanding virality and popularity that characterize some top-
ics. In this work we characterize the relation between trends and geography by tracking and
analyzing trending topics on Twitter in 63 main locations of the United States and at the
country level, for a period of 50 days in 2013 [116].
In this section we discuss the methodology we followed to generate a dataset of Twitter
trends, and the derived temporal dependence network that allows us to unveil the dynamics
of trend production and consumption.
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Table 4.1: The list of the 63 trend locations in the United States and the relative total
number of trends (thousands) they generated in the period between April, 12th and the end
of May 2013.
Albuquerque 6.7 Atlanta 5.1 Austin 5.8 Baltimore 5.8
Baton Rouge 6.5 Birmingham 6.1 Boston 5.0 Charlotte 5.2
Chicago 5.2 Cincinnati 5.8 Cleveland 5.4 Colorado Springs 6.7
Columbus 6.0 Dallas-Ft. Worth 5.3 Denver 6.1 Detroit 4.8
El Paso 6.5 Fresno 6.6 Greensboro 5.8 Harrisburg 6.3
Honolulu 6.5 Houston 5.1 Indianapolis 5.9 Jackson 6.8
Jacksonville 6.0 Kansas City 5.7 Las Vegas 5.4 Long Beach 6.5
Los Angeles 5.2 Louisville 5.9 Memphis 6.5 Mesa 6.6
Miami 5.5 Milwaukee 5.8 Minneapolis 5.6 Nashville 6.0
New Haven 5.6 New Orleans 6.2 New York 4.4 Norfolk 6.0
Oklahoma City 5.8 Omaha 6.4 Orlando 5.8 Philadelphia 5.1
Phoenix 5.9 Pittsburgh 5.8 Portland 6.4 Providence 5.9
Raleigh 5.3 Richmond 6.2 Sacramento 5.9 Salt Lake City 6.4
San Antonio 5.8 San Diego 6.2 San Francisco 5.7 San Jose 6.6
Seattle 5.9 St. Louis 5.7 Tallahassee 6.3 Tampa 5.6
Tucson 6.6 Virginia Beach 6.8 Washington 4.7
4.1.1 Trends Dataset
To build our dataset we monitored in real-time all trends appearing on Twitter for a period
of 50 days, starting from April, 12th until the end of May 2013.
The Twitter homepage provides a trends box that contains the top 10 trending hash-
tags or phrases at any given moment, ranked according to their popularity. Oftentimes, a
promoted trend is shown in 1st position — for our analysis we disregarded promoted trends
since their popularity is artificially inflated by the advertisement.
Each Twitter user can monitor the trends at the worldwide, country, or city level. Twitter
has identified 63 locations in the United States, displayed in Figure 4.4, for which it is possible
to follow local trends. The full list of locations is reported in Table 4.1. It is worth noting
that some areas are over-represented (for example the East coast and California), while some
states (namely, North and South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, and Alaska) are not
represented at all.1
We deployed a Web crawler to check at regular intervals of 10 minutes the trends of each
of these 63 locations and, in addition, those at the country level. We ended up collecting
1This has to do with the fact that the activity on Twitter in those states is very low.
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11,402 different trends overall: 4,513 hashtags and 6,889 phrases. Table 4.1 also reports how
many trends have been observed in each location.
4.1.2 Trend Pathway Backbone Network
To investigate where trends usually start and how they propagate from city to city, we built
a temporal dependence network of the 63 locations of the United States represented in our
dataset.
This network is directed and weighted: each node corresponds to one of the 63 cities,
and the weight of an arc eij from node i to node j is increased every time location i exhibits
a trend before location j. The weight of arc eij therefore represents the extent to which city
i precedes city j in adopting a trend: the higher the weight, the more often location i sets
the trends that location j will later adopt.
Due to the fact that the adopted dataset contains a large number of trending hashtags
and phrases, the network obtained using the procedure described above is fully-connected.
This makes the extraction of relevant connections hard, as each location is connected with
all the others and only the weight of the connections vary.
To ease the analysis we applied to this network an edge filtering technique known as
multiscale backbone extraction [252]. The goal of this procedure is to retain only those
connections that are statistically significant, by removing all edges whose weight does not
deviate sufficiently from a null model. The significance level of an edge is determined by a
threshold parameter α. Lowering α progressively removes edges and eventually causes the
disruption of the network. We tuned α to obtain the backbone network with the minimum
number of edges that suffices to maintain all 63 nodes connected (α = 0.3). The resulting
multiscale backbone of the network is used for the analysis of pathways of trend diffusion,
and to investigate trendsetting and trend-following dynamics.
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of the number of trends appearing in different number of places.
Inset: y-axis reported in a log-scale.
Figure 4.2: Lifetime of a trend. Left: as function of the number of cities in which a trend
has appeared. Right: as function of its entropy. In both plots, the dark blue line is the
average across trends while the standard error is depicted in light blue.
4.1.3 Spatio-temporal Trend Analysis
In our first experiment we aim to give a statistical characterization of trends: in particular,
we start investigating in how many different cities trends appear. In Figure 4.1 we report
the number of trends appearing in a given number of distinct locations. Trends follow a
bimodal distribution, typically appearing either in one or few locations, or in all or most of
them. We can identify three behaviors: (i) a large fraction of trends are localized and not
sustained enough to spread from their originating place to others; (ii) another comparably
large fraction of trends diffuse all over the cities generating a global phenomenon across
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Figure 4.3: Shared trend similarity and hierarchical clustering of the 63 locations.
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the country; and (iii) the small remainder diffuse from the originating place to some other
places, but fail to achieve global popularity.
The lifetime of trends is broadly distributed: short-lived topics trending for less than 20
minutes amount for more than 68% of the total, and overall trends shorter than six hours
cover more than 95% of our sample. Sporadically some trends happen to live a much longer
time, with only 0.3% surviving for more than a day.
We now focus on the spatio-temporal dimension of trends, aiming to determine how
much time each trend spends in one or several locations. In particular, we calculate the
average lifetime of a trend (the average amount of time a given hashtag or phrase is trending
somewhere) as a function of the number of cities in which it appears. Figure 4.2 (left panel)
reflects the intuition that trends reaching more places live longer.
Another way to determine the relation between the geographic spread of trends and their
temporal patterns is to measure their lifetime as a function of entropy, defined as Sj =
−∑i P ji logP ji , with P ji = tji∑
k t
j
k
, where tji is the time topic j has been trending in location
i. The entropy is low if the trending topic is concentrated in a few places, and maximal if the
topic trends for equal durations of time in all places. Figure 4.2 (right panel) shows that for
trends with low entropy (i.e., those concentrated in a single location), the expected lifetime is
very short. The lifetime increases significantly (five-fold) for the maximum observed entropy.
This analysis reveals a key ingredient for global trend popularity: the trending time of a
topic is not only determined by its lifetime in a single location, but also by its geographic
spread across many locations.
4.1.4 Geography of Trends
Let us examine the geographic patterns of trends, namely whether geographically close cities
share more similar trends than cities that are physically far apart. To determine if this
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Figure 4.4: geographic representation of the 63 locations and respective clusters.
locality effect exists, we first isolate, for each location i, the set of trends Ti that appeared
in that location. Then, for each pair of locations i and j we compute the pairwise Jaccard
similarity
Sij =
|Ti
⋂
Tj |
|Ti
⋃
Tj | . (4.1)
The Jaccard similarity ranges between 0 and 1: the higher the value, the more similar the
trends exhibited by two different cities. These values of similarity are subsequently passed
to a hierarchical clustering algorithm after being transformed in distances: dij = 1 − Sij .
This is done to determine whether it is possible to isolate clusters of locations that exhibit
similar trends, and, if so, whether these locations are geographically close or spread all over
the country. The result is showed in Figure 4.3 and discussed next.
4.1.4.1 Locality Effects
Figure 4.3 is constituted by two parts: a heat-map representing the pairwise Jaccard similar-
ity among locations, and a dendrogram generated according to an agglomerative hierarchical
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clustering algorithm using complete linkage. Analyzing the dendrogram we can identify three
distinct clusters, whose members (reported in different colors: green, yellow and red) share
a high internal similarity in the trends exhibited during the observation period. This cluster
emerges applying a cut to the dendrogram for a distance value of 0.5. We can also identify a
fourth cluster (in purple, emerging with a dendrogram cut corresponding to a distance value
of 0.75) that exhibits a lower internal similarity and whose members show a low similarity
with those of other clusters. The four clusters are reported in Table 4.2, and displayed in
Figure 4.4.
From the figure we observe that the green, yellow and red clusters are somewhat geo-
graphically localized, while the purple one is spread more or less all over the country. In
detail, the green cluster, with the highest internal similarity, roughly corresponds to the
Southwest of the country. The yellow cluster follows, representing the Midwest and South.
The red cluster, which is less localized, matches many locations in the East coast and Mid-
west. The purple cluster includes several major metropolitan areas [302].
Table 4.2: Clusters of cities according to trend similarity.
Green Yellow Red Purple
Long Beach Memphis St. Louis Washington
Fresno Salt Lake City San Antonio New York
Mesa Harrisburg Milwaukee Detroit
Tucson New Orleans Tampa Boston
Albuquerque Baton Rouge Pittsburgh San Francisco
Virginia Beach Portland New Haven Cleveland
San Jose Tallahassee Seattle Minneapolis
Colorado Springs San Diego Cincinnati Las Vegas
Jackson Kansas City Austin Houston
Honolulu Oklahoma City Orlando Charlotte
El Paso Birmingham Baltimore Raleigh
Omaha Louisville Greensboro Los Angeles
Jacksonville Nashville Dallas-Ft. Worth
Norfolk Chicago
Providence Philadelphia
Denver Miami
Richmond Atlanta
Phoenix
Sacramento
Columbus
Indianapolis
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4.1.4.2 Significance of Geographic Clustering
To determine the statistical significance of the clustering obtained by using the previous
method we proceeded as follows: we first computed the distribution of similarity values
among all pairs of locations belonging to the same cluster (intra-cluster similarities); then,
we did the same for the pairs belonging to different clusters (inter-cluster similarities). After
that, we applied a kernel smoothing technique known as Kernel Density Estimation [147] to
estimate the probability density functions for our similarity distributions, plotted in Figure
4.5 (the distribution of each cluster is represented by its color corresponding to Table 4.2).
We applied a t-test to determine if any given pair of distributions of intra- and inter-
cluster similarity might originate from the same distribution, assessing that all distributions
(and, therefore, the clusters) are significant at the 99% confidence level.
We also compared the result of the hierarchical clustering with that of two network
clustering algorithms (namely, Infomap [245] and the ‘Louvain method’ [40]) applied to the
trend pathway backbone network. We obtained consistent results in all cases: the only
difference was that Seattle was placed in the purple cluster by both network clustering
methods.
Figure 4.5: Kernel Density Estimation of intra- and inter-cluster similarity of the four clus-
ters.
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Figure 4.6: Trend pathways in Twitter. Trends spread in the direction from blue to red.
4.1.5 Trend Pathway Analysis
To establish where trends start and what pathways they follow to diffuse in the country,
we analyze the multiscale trend pathway backbone network and represented in Figure 4.6
by using a divided edge bundling technique [250]. This visualization strategy has been
successfully applied to other geographic networks such as the US airport traffic network (cf.
[250]). In this node-link representation the edges are bundled taking into account directions
and weights. The thicker the bundle, the higher the sum of the weights of connections
wrapped in the bundle. In our case, this yields a network visualization that highlights the
pathways followed by trends as they flow across the country. In this figure the direction of
edges represents the information flow: the tails of the bundles (in blue) show where trends
start, the heads of the bundles (in red) point to where the trends arrive. From Figure
4.6 we can draw two observations: first, the presence of a massive backbone that carries
the trend flow from the East coast to the West coast and vice-versa. Second, we observe a
negligible North-South flow, except for that connecting Florida to the East coast. Moreover,
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the fact that the East-to-West flow is well balanced by the that in the opposite direction
suggests that we are not simply observing an artifact of the time-zone effect: the West coast
contributes to shaping the country trends to a similar extent that the East coast does.
In the backbone network the cities that often generate trends are those with higher
fractions of outgoing edges (that is, those that spread their trends to most of the other
cities); henceforth we will call them sources. Vice-versa, we will call sinks those cities with
higher fraction of incoming edges. More precisely, since the network we deal with is weighted,
we compute the weighted source-sink ratio ω(n) for each node n as
ω(n) =
sout(n)
sin(n) + sout(n)
, (4.2)
where sin(n) (resp., sout(n)) is the in-strength (resp., out-strength) of that node. We report
in Table 4.3 the top 5 sources and the top 5 sinks of the backbone network. Four out of
the five top sources (all but Cincinnati) also happen to be major metropolitan areas. On
the other hand, all sinks belong to the Southwest and Midwest parts of the country. Los
Angeles and New York (among our top sources) have also been reported in the top 5 hashtag
producers worldwide in the recent work by Kamath et al. [164].
4.1.6 Trendsetters and Trend-followers
The source-sink analysis presented above triggered our interest in the dynamics of trend
popularity. In the following we study trendsetting and trend-following patterns, driven by
Table 4.3: Left: top 5 sources (i.e., trendsetters). Right: top 5 sinks (i.e., trend-followers).
Location Rank ω(n) Location Rank ω(n)
Los Angeles 1st 0.806 Oklahoma City 63rd 0.101
Cincinnati 2nd 0.736 Albuquerque 62nd 0.109
Washington 3rd 0.718 El Paso 61st 0.235
Seattle 4th 0.711 Omaha 60th 0.305
New York 5th 0.669 Kansas City 59th 0.352
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the following question: Are trending topics that become popular at the country level produced
uniformly by all cities, or preferentially by some of them?
To answer this question we selected from our dataset all those trends that at some point
in time became trending at the country level. This left us with 1,724 hashtags and 2,768
phrases that achieved the highest popularity in the United States, appearing in the top 10
trending topics at the country level. We then selected the set of cities that exhibited each
of these trends, and divided them in two categories: those cities in which the hashtag or
phrase was trending before it became trending at the country level, and those cities that
adopted it after it became trending at the country level. This allows us to determine what
are the cities that contribute more to shaping the trends at the country level, and what are
the cities that are more influenced by these global trends: in other words, we can identify
trendsetters and trend-followers.
Figure 4.7: Trendsetting vs. trend-following cities. The x-axis shows the number of times a
topic trending in a particular city later trends at the country level, while the y-axis shows
the number of times of the reverse effect. The inset shows a Gaussian Mixture Model
highlighting the two different trendsetting dynamics; the contours represent the standard
deviations of each Gaussian distribution. In the main plot, two linear regressions are reported
with the corresponding coefficient of determination R2. City colors correspond to the cluster
assignment in Table 4.2.
Figure 4.7 shows the result of this analysis for the hashtags. We can immediately identify
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two different classes of cities: the majority of them (i.e., all those in the upper-left part of
the main plot) appear to influence country-level trends roughly to the same extent to which
they are influenced by the global trends; a second class of cities seem to have a much stronger
trendsetting role toward the country.
To assess if these two classes can be significantly distinguished, we use the Expectation
Maximization algorithm to learn an optimal Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM); to determine
the appropriate number of components of the mixture we perform a 5-fold cross-validation
using Bayesian and Akaike information criteria as quality measures, by varying the number
of components from 1 to 10. The outcome of the cross-validation determines that the optimal
number of components is two, according to both criteria, matching our expectations.
The result of the GMM is showed in the inset of Figure 4.7: each point is assigned to
one of the two components yielding two different clusters composed respectively of 11 trend-
setting cities (red dots) and 52 trend-following cities (blue stars). The list of trendsetters
includes (in ascending order of impact) Raleigh, Detroit, Philadelphia, Houston, New York,
Dallas-Ft. Worth, Boston, Denver, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Seattle. All of them are major
metropolitan areas.
To highlight the existence of these two different dynamics we applied a regression analysis
approach by fitting two different linear regressions to the points belonging to the classes of
trendsetters (coefficient of determination R2 = 0.9455, p-value p = 3.9 · 10−7) and trend-
followers (R2 = 0.7063, p < 10−10). This points out the proportionality that exists between
incoming and outgoing trend flows.
We repeated this analysis by making the model even more realistic: for example, we
introduced the effect of the time lag, discounting the reward given to those cities that adopt
a trend later with respect to the initiators; also, we rewarded only the initiators of each
trend, rather than any city that exhibits a given trend before the trending point at the
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country level. Making the scenario more realistic did not affect the outcome: in all cases we
obtained comparable results.
The fourth, purple cluster identified in clustering analysis deserves further discussion.
Differently from the others, this cluster is not geographically well defined (cf. Figure ??) —
it contains metropolitan areas spread all over the country. Is the effect of city size sufficient
to explain why these metropolitan areas are more influential than others, in the sense that
they produce more national trends? It is not obvious that large populations would lead
to more national trends: while a larger city produces more tweets and possibly more topic
competing for popularity, the number of trends for each city at a given time is bounded
to ten, irrespective of the city size. In cities with larger content production, hashtags (or
phrases) must appear in more tweets to be listed as a trend, whereas a lower number of
tweets is sufficient in cities with smaller content production. As a result, the effect of sheer
volume is discounted by construction in the definition of Twitter trends.
Why, then, do the metropolitan areas in the purple cluster play such a trendsetting role?
A possible interpretation is offered by noticing the presence in this cluster of some of the
major airport hubs of the United States, such as Atlanta, Chicago, and Los Angeles. The
list of top US airport hubs [303] is shown in Table 4.4, where we aggregated the traffic by
metropolitan area. Surprisingly, 16 out of the 17 locations that constitute the cluster appear
in the top 20 air traffic hubs — all of them but Cleveland. On the other hand, some cities
in the cluster that do not belong in the top 30 metropolitan areas by population (Charlotte,
Raleigh, Las Vegas), do appear among the major air traffic hubs.
The presence of major air traffic hubs among the special class of cities that act as
trendsetters suggests an intriguing conjecture, drawing a parallel with the spread of diseases:
Does information travel faster by airplane than over the Internet? In other words, do
conversations and trends spread following social interaction dynamics, like social butterflies
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Table 4.4: Top 20 cities ranked according to the total volume of flight traffic.
City Cluster Rank Total traffic
New York (JFK, EWR, LGA) purple 6th, 14th, 20th 54,374,758∗
Atlanta (ATL) purple 1st 45,798,809
Chicago (ORD, MDW) purple 2nd, 25th 41,603,539∗
Miami (MIA, FLL, PBI) purple 12th, 21st, 54th 33,228,913∗
Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW, DAL) purple 4th, 45th 31,925,398∗
Washington (BWI, IAD, DCA) purple 22nd, 23rd, 26th 31,431,854∗
Los Angeles (LAX) purple 3rd 31,326,268
Denver (DEN) red 5th 25,799,832
Charlotte/Raleigh (CLT, RDU) purple 8th, 37th 24,521,523∗
Houston (IAH, HOU) purple 11th, 32nd 24,082,666∗
San Francisco (SFO) purple 7th 21,284,224
Las Vegas (LAS) purple 9th 19,941,173
Phoenix (PHX) red 10th 19,556,189
Orlando (MCO) red 13th 17,159,425
Seattle (SEA) red 15th 16,121,123
Minneapolis (MSP) purple 16th 15,943,751
Detroit (DTW) purple 17th 15,599,877
Philadelphia (PHL) purple 18th 14,587,631
Boston (BOS) purple 19th 14,293,675
Salt Lake City (SLC) yellow 24th 9,579,836
(∗) Sum of the traffic volume of different airports in the same area.
that pass from person to person at the local level, or do they diffuse using traveling people
as vectors, similarly to epidemics that take advantage of human mobility [18,79]?
Further work is needed to explore this conjecture. One possibility would be to measure
the correlation between trend overlap among pairs of cities and the corresponding air traffic.
4.2 Spatiotemporal Analysis of Censorship
Many countries want to control online services, if possible, and otherwise apply censorship
on content or users. China is one counties that applies strict regulations on social media.
The majority of the related research focused on Weibo platform, since the Great Firewall of
China prevents foreigner social media services. Here we studied censorship on Twitter and
analyzed withheld content. The present work, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to
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explore global scale censorship on Twitter.
A well-known example of internet censorship is the Great Firewall of China, which
applies broader censorship than any other regulations and has developed its own platforms
to control content produced by its citizens. Sina Weibo is the most active social networking
site in China and also a replacement for Twitter in the face of China’s strict censorship
policies. Censorship on the Weibo platform has been studied in terms of identifying topics
of censored content, temporal characterization of content deletions, and different censorship
practices [19,315,316].
Social media platforms are receiving an increasing number of requests for content removal
and account closures. When these requests are rejected, some governments simply terminate
access to these services. Twitter is one such platform receiving censorship requests and
being censored. To respond to censorship requests, Twitter developed a system to withhold
tweets and users from particular locations based on the internet protocol (IP) addresses of
users. Twitter’s approach limits access to content from particular locations as requested by
governments while protecting the rights of other users to access content.
This work reports the results of a study exploring the effectiveness of Twitter’s censorship
policy [281]. As part of our study we also characterized the behavior of users and the effects
of censorship on information diffusion. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
study exploring censorship applied on Twitter
4.2.1 Twitter Withheld Content
Twitter is a popular micro-blogging platform that is available to millions of people all over
the world. Users can interact by creating social ties (friend/follower relations), retweeting
content of others to disseminate that content among their friends, and mentioning other
users in their posts. Twitter users can post up to 140 characters per tweet including URLs
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Figure 4.8: Example of withheld tweet (top) and user (bottom) when they are accessed from
censored country.
and external media content, such as pictures and videos, alongside text.
Some of the content shared on Twitter might not be legal under applicable laws in various
countries such as copyright, pornography, threatening messages, and insults to other users.
Twitter receives requests for removal of content and users from various governments and law
enforcement agencies. If removal requests are submitted properly by authorized entities,
Twitter grants censorship to these requests.
Another practice applied by Twitter is censoring content by withholding it under certain
criteria. They can limit access to a particular tweet or user when requested by some country.
Withheld tweets are censored only by the country that makes such a request to Twitter.
Users from countries in “withhold scope” see a notification message about censored tweets
in their timelines or in their profiles. Similarly, user accounts can also be withheld under
certain conditions and all content created by those users will not be accessible from censoring
countries. Examples of notification messages for withheld tweets and users are shown in
Fig. 4.8. To apply content censorship, Twitter determines the user locations based on IP
addresses. Extensive details about how Twitter processes these requests are found in the
Twitter support page.2
Twitter also issues quarterly reports with information about the number of requests
2https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169222
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Table 4.5: Descriptions for Twitter censorship decision organized in three categories: with-
held, unwithheld, and denied or objected requests. We used explanations from the Twitter
transparency pages for each case [273].
Country Status Explanation
Turkey withheld Court orders directing Twitter to remove content in Turkey regarding
violations of personal rights and defamation of both private citizens
and/or government officials.
Russia withheld Requests received from the Federal Service for Supervision in the
Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communica-
tions (Roskomnadzor) regarding content implicating Federal Law 139
and Federal Law 398. This law allows Russian authorities to restrict
access to content that is deemed to be extremist or that leads to mass
actions.
Germany withheld Request received from courts and Jugendschutz (child protection) about
defamation and usage of prohibited symbols and illegal discriminatory
content.
Turkey unwithheld Twitter unwithheld content on two separate occasions: when Turkey
ban on access to Twitter on March 2014 and Twitters objections to
previously censored content were accepted by the courts.
Brazil unwithheld Tweets were censored after the request of the Constitutional Court for
violating local electoral law and later unwithheld.
Pakistan unwithheld Twitter reversed their censorship to content previously withheld due to
demand made by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority for vio-
lating local blasphemy law.
Turkey objected Twitter filed legal objection with Turkish courts in response to their
requests when Twitter believed the order interfered with freedom of
expression law or had other deficiencies.
Russia denied Twitter denied Russia’s requests on silencing popular critics of the Rus-
sian government and limiting speech about non-violent demonstrations
in Ukraine.
received and summarizes the reasons behind each decision made in a particular country.3
Examples of these explanations are shown in Table 4.5.
4.2.2 Data Collection
To study censored content on Twitter, we first extracted all withheld tweets and their
retweets from our collection (approximately a 10% random sample of all public tweets
streamed in real time) starting from June 2013 to December 2015. Twitter API provides
meta-data information about withheld tweets. In real-time stream, censorship information
3https://transparency.twitter.com/removal-requests
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Table 4.6: Dataset statistics.
Censored tweets 53,028
Retweets of censored content 99,643
Avg. retweets for censored tweets 64.2
Censored tweet for copyright 310
Unique user created censored content 716
User tweet or retweet censored content 29,619
is not available for the original tweets. We detect censorship through observing retweets of
original tweet after the censorship. We identify withheld tweets by monitoring first occur-
rence of withheld information from the meta-data of retweets. This collection consists of
29,619 unique users who were tweeting and retweeting censored content and 716 of these
accounts created at least one censored tweet. We analyzed 2,787 users who tweeted or
retweeted at least 3 censored messages and 325 who created at least one censored tweet. We
then collected all their tweets, retweets and retweets of their tweets. Basic statistics about
our dataset are summarized in Table 4.6.
4.2.3 Censored Tweets
Twitter has been accepting requests for content removals starting from 2012. Since that time
several countries have been submitting requests. Consequently, thousands of tweets have
been withheld temporarily or permanently. We collected those censored tweets and their
retweets. The amount of censored content by countries is shown in Fig. 4.9. We observe
consistent statistics with Twitter transparency reports as Turkey (TR), Russia (RU) and
Germany (DE) are listed as top countries. We also notice that not all the country codes map
a particular geographic location. For instance XZ and XY represent international waters
and copyright, respectively.
To characterize the temporal changes of censorship, we study the volume of censored
content and their corresponding countries. In Fig. 4.10, we observe a rapid increase in the
volume of censored tweets starting from January 2014. The number of censored tweets
63
Figure 4.9: Distribution of withheld tweet frequencies by countries
Figure 4.10: Time series of weekly frequencies of withheld content.
reveals an increasing trend. We also observe seasonal changes for the amount of withheld
content due to the activity rate of some popular accounts. Active accounts receive more
attention as a result of the political discussion that occurred in some countries during that
period. For instance Turkey’s censorship requests were highest in January 2015 and Russia
had more censorship requests during July 2015.
The distribution of censored content per user follows a power law behavior as shown in
Fig. 4.11. There are a few users with more than one thousand withheld tweets, but usually
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we observe per users 10 to 100 censored tweets. Highly censored users are usually targeted
by governments. As a result, users create more content after their first experience of being
censored and increase their activity, resulting in more censored content.
Figure 4.11: Distribution of withheld content per user.
4.2.4 Geographical Censorship
To investigate the effectiveness of IP-based censorship, we analyzed user language and time-
zone preferences as proxies for user location. We investigated the relationship between
censored countries and time zone and language preferences of retweeting users. In Twitter,
users can choose their preferred language, but the language choosen does not necessarily
match the language of the content of the tweets. In Figure 4.12, we show co-occurrence
between censored country codes and the primary language of users. In this analysis, we
can see a relationship between countries and languages due to their political and cultural
relevance. For instance the majority of users retweeting censored content in Brazil list their
languages as Portuguese, Spanish, and English. Similarly censored content in Russia is
retweeted by mostly Ukrainian, Russian, and English-speaking users and content in Turkey
is retweeted by Turkish, English, and Arabic speakers. We can also note that English and
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Spanish are common languages for users in most of the withheld countries.
An alternative analysis can be carried out using time-zone preferences as a proxy for
user location. As we show in Fig. 4.12, users have diverse time-zone preferences regardless
of where the content is being censored. For instance in Turkey and Russia, majority of the
retweets are created by users from UTC+2 and UTC+3 time zones, which correspond to
these countries’ local time zones.
These analysis of language and time-zone preferences indicate that the audience of cen-
sored content is not bound by geographic location. It is known that citizens of countries
with strict internet regulations adopt strategies against censorship by using VPN services
or changing DNS settings to access censored sites.
4.3 Roles of Users During Gezi Movement
In this work we focus on the Gezi Park protest, a social uprising whose events unfolded
during May and June 2013 in Turkey [224, 284]. Political and policy issues related to this
movement have been recently discussed in the social science literature [136, 175]. Here
instead we present an empirical analysis of the conversation about Gezi Park that occurred
on Twitter. Our goal is to gain insight to the protest discussion dynamics. In particular,
we aim at exploring three different aspects of this conversation: (i) its spatio-temporal
dimension, to determine whether it was concentrated only in the country of inception, or if
it acquired significant attention worldwide, and to assess how it started and what trends it
generated; (ii) what roles individuals played in this conversation and what influence they
had on others, and whether such roles changed over time as information was diffused and
the protests unfolded; (iii) and how the online behavior of individuals changed over time in
response to real-world events. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to explore
the temporal evolution of online user roles and behaviors as a reflection of on-the-ground
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Figure 4.12: Co-occurrence relations for censorship countries (columns) shown for retweeting
user’s language (left panel) and utf-offset (right panel). Observed frequencies are normalized
by shared countries to highlight the distribution of retweeting users.
events during a social upheaval. We do so by means of computational tools and data-driven
analyses.
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4.3.1 Background of the Protest
In this section we provide some background information about the Gezi Park movement,
explaining the context of the protests, the triggers for the mobilization, the timeline of
events, and the ways which those events unfolded.
The protests began quietly in an already politically divided Turkey on May 28, 2013
with about 50–100 environmental activists who gathered for a sit-in at Gezi Park in Taksim
Square, Istambul. They were there to demonstrate against the destruction of one of the last
public green spaces in central Istanbul. The government had slated the space for the con-
struction of a replica of an Ottoman-era barracks that would be the site of luxury residences
and a shopping mall. The peaceful encampment successfully resisted the demolition of the
park by bulldozers when demonstrators refused to leave. At dawn on the morning of May
30, and then again the next morning, the protesters were attacked by the police using tear
gas and water cannons, triggering clashes between authorities and the demonstrators that
lasted until the end of the park occupation on June 15. During that time period, the size
of the groups of demonstrators escalated to about 10,000 on both the European and Asian
sides of the Bosphorus and many thousands more in major cities across the country. The
focus of the protests grew from upset over Gezi Park’s potential destruction to widespread
criticism of the government’s increasingly authoritarian practices and intrusions into the
private lives of its citizens. As the New York Times reported,
In full public view, a long struggle over urban spaces is erupting as a broader fight
over Turkish identity, where difficult issues of religion, social class and politics
intersect. [12]
Throughout the struggle, the protesters, who mostly consisted of middle-class secular Turks
but also included some members of left-wing groups and nationalists, used social media to
alert others to their plans, urge others to join them, warn participants of police attacks and
potential danger spots, provide information about makeshift medical assistance locations,
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Table 4.7: List of relevant events during the protest divided in three categories.
Code Event date Event description
G
ov
er
nm
en
t A1 2013-05-29 Prime minister Erdogan’s statement: “No matter what you
do, we took our final decision about Gezi Park.”
A2 2013-06-02 Erdogan refers to protesters as marauders (çapulcu).
A3 2013-06-03 Erdogan says “There is 50 percent, and we can barely keep
them at home. But we have called on them to calm down”
before his trip to Morocco.
P
ol
ic
e
B1 2013-05-30 Police forces raids Gezi Park by using tear gas and destroys
tents of protesters without any notice.
B2 2013-06-03 Official statements about the first death and many injuries
all around Turkey.
B3 2013-06-11 Riot police enters Taksim square with water cannons and
uses tear gas against the protesters.
B4 2013-06-15 Police clears Gezi Park and takes out the protesters. Police
starts to stake out Gezi Park.
P
ro
te
st
s
C1 2013-06-04 A library is built by the protesters in Gezi Park.
C2 2013-06-13 Mothers join protests after Huseyin Mutlu’s (Governor of
Istanbul) calls to mothers to bring their children home.
C3 2013-06-17 Silent protest in Taksim square held by a standing man.
Many others gather after his protest.
and announce their goals. A poll of about 3,000 activists found that the motivation of the
demonstrators was their anger with Prime Minister Erdogan and not his political party
or his aides. More than 90% of the respondents said they took to the streets because of
Erdogan’s authoritarian attitude [276].
A detailed timeline of the Gezi Park protests’ major events during this period is provided
in Table 4.7.
4.3.2 Data Collection
Our analysis is based on data collected from Twitter. Twitter users can post tweets up to
140 characters in length, which might contain URLs and media alongside text. Users can
also interact with each other through various means, including the creation of directed social
links (follower/followee relations), retweeting content (i.e., rebroadcasting messages to their
followers), and mentioning other users in their posts. Tweets may also contain hashtags,
that are keywords used to give a topical connotation to the tweets (like #direngeziparki and
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#occupygezi). Multiple hashtags might co-occur in the same tweet.
The dataset collected for our study comes from a 10% random sample of all tweets
streamed in real time, which was stored, post-processed and analyzed in-house. The obser-
vation period covers 27 days, from May 25th to June 20th, 2013: this time window started
four days prior to the beginning of the Gezi Park events, and fully covered the three weeks
during which the main protests unfolded. The short period prior to the protest inception is
used as baseline to define user activity and interests.
Our sample not only contains information about the tweets, but also meta-data about
the users, including their screen names, follower/followee counts, self-reported locations, and
more. Additionally, for content posted with a GPS-enabled smartphone, we have access to
the geographic location from which the tweets were generated.
To isolate a representative sample of topical discussion about Gezi Park events, we
adopted a hashtag seed-expansion procedure [82]: first, we hand-picked the most popu-
lar Gezi Park related hashtag (#diregeziparki) and we extracted all tweets containing this
hashtag during our 27-day long period of interest. We then built the hashtag co-occurrence
list, and we selected the top 100 hashtags co-occurring with our seed (#diregeziparki). We
generated our final list of hashtags of interest to include the set of commonly co-occurring
hashtags and expanded our dataset collecting all tweets containing any of these hashtags.
These hashtags were manually divided in three categories: general-interest hashtags, local
protest related ones, and finally those used by government supporters. A detailed list con-
taining the top general-purpose, local-protest, and government-support hashtags are listed
in Table 4.8.
Overall, we collected 2,361,335 tweets associated with the Gezi Park movement, gener-
ated by 855,616 distinct users and containing a total of 64,668 unique hashtags. Among
these 2.3 million tweets, 1,475,494 are retweets and 47,163 are replies from one users to
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Table 4.8: Set of hashtags commonly used by protesters and government supporters.
Common hashtags Local protest hashtags Gov. supporters’ hashtags
#direngeziparki #bizeheryertaksim #direnankara #dunyaliderierdogan
#occupygezi #gezideyim #direnbesiktas #seviyoruzsenierdogan
#eylemvakti #7den77yedireniyoruz #direnizmir #seninleyizerdogan
#occupyturkey #siddetidurdurun #direntaksim #seninleyiztayyiperdogan
#direngezi #korkakmedya #direnadana #youcantstopturkishsuccess
#tayyipistifa #hukumetistifa #direndersim #weareerdogan
#bubirsivildirenis #dictatorerdogan #direnistanbul #yedirmeyiz
#wearegezi #direnrize
another. Also, 43,646 tweets have latitude/longitude coordinates. We adopt this subset of
geolocated tweets to study the spatio-temporal nature of the protest.
To study type of information carried through conversation and identify roles of partici-
pating users during protest, we randomly selected users from our collection. In this work,
135 users and content they created (tweets) and broadcasted (retweets) were extracted for
annotation. We annotated 5126 tweets according to rules in our codebook.
Each tweet in our collection was annotated to highlight the message conveyed by the
context. Textual information contained in the tweets was studied mainly in three annotation
classes:
• Purpose categorizes motivation of user for sharing particular content. This annotation
highlights motivation behind creating tweets or in broadcasting a particular message.
• Position groups different opinions toward particular events or discussions.
• Information share classifies type of information conveyed through messages.
In this annotation task, distribution of labels within each category are summarized in
Table 4.10. Occurrence of those labels are not homogenous within the categories and some
labels are used more frequent than others. If the annotator can not find a match between
annotation labels and tweets, they assign those tweets to “others” category.
During the same 27-day long observation period, we monitored the Twitter trends oc-
curring at the country level in Turkey, and at the metropolitan area level in 12 major cities
as provided by Twitter, namely: Adana, Bursa, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Di-
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Table 4.9: Trends in Turkey (country level) and in 12 Turkish cities during the observation
period.
Trend Location Top 5 trending hashtags/phrases
Turkey Turkey, Necati Şaşmaz, #DirenGeziSeninleyiz, #OyunaGelmiyoruzTakipleşiy-
oruz, #ProvokatörlereUYMA
Istanbul Turkey, Necati Şaşmaz, #DirenGeziSeninleyiz, Bruno Alves, #OyunaGelmiy-
oruzTakipleşiyoruz
Ankara Turkey, Necati Şaşmaz, Bruno Alves, #DirenGeziSeninleyiz, #Provokatör-
lereUYMA
Izmir Turkey, Necati Şaşmaz, #DirenGeziSeninleyiz, #TatilöncesiTakipleşelim,
#ProvokatörlereUYMA
Bursa Turkey, #TatilöncesiTakipleşelim, Necati Şaşmaz, #KızlarTakipleşiyor, #ça-
pulcularTakipleşirse
Adana Turkey, #çapulcularTakipleşirse, #TatilöncesiTakipleşelim, Necati Şaşmaz,
#DirenGeziSeninleyiz
Gaziantep Turkey, Necati Şaşmaz, #SesVerTürkiyeBuÜlkeSahipsizDeğil, #DirenGeziS-
eninleyiz, #OyunaGelmiyoruzTakipleşiyoruz
Konya #TatilöncesiTakipleşelim, Turkey, #BizimDelilerTakipleşiyor, Necati Şaşmaz,
#SesVerTürkiyeBuÜlkeSahipsizDeğil
Antalya Turkey, #KızlarTakipleşiyor, #CapulchularTakipleşiyor, #Türkiye-
BaşbakanınınYanında, Necati Şaşmaz
Diyarbakir Turkey, Necati Şaşmaz, #DirenGeziSeninleyiz, #OyunaGelmiyoruzTakipleşiy-
oruz, #ProvokatörlereUYMA
Mersin #HayranGruplarıTakipleşiyor, Turkey, #TatilöncesiTakipleşelim,
#TürkiyemDireniyor, #direnankara
Kayseri Turkey, Necati Şaşmaz, #DirenGeziSeninleyiz, #Seni_Görünce, #Provokatör-
lereUYMA
Eskisehir Turkey, Necati Şaşmaz, #DirenGeziSeninleyiz, #OyunaGelmiyoruzTakipleşiy-
oruz, #ProvokatörlereUYMA
yarbakir, Eskisehir, Antalya, Konya and Mersin. The list of top 10 hashtags and phrases
trending both at the country level and at the city level were pulled from the platform at reg-
ular intervals of 10 minutes. This method [116] is used in our analysis to define the similarity
of topical interests and the patterns of collective attention towards Gezi Park conversation
in the country. During this period we also monitored worldwide trends to determine if and
when the discussion about the protest achieved global visibility. A detailed list of the top
popular trending hashtags and phrases for each location and at the country level is provided
in Table 4.9.
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Annotation
category
Category description # of T # of T+RT
Purpose
Sharing specific information heard about 849 1559
Opinion statement 292 506
General information 289 467
Links to outside information 230 354
Support for movement 103 239
First person witness 130 226
Ask for help or warn 81 209
Provide direction 110 184
Hashtag 86 142
Information dissemination 62 135
Media coverage 52 80
Emotional statement 16 29
Position
General opinion 485 710
Anger against govt/PM/police 244 435
Support for movement / motivational 214 363
Praise or support for groups / individuals 91 183
Critical statement about people / business or organi-
zation of demon
84 161
Pro-government / police or anti-Gezi opinion 59 80
Info share
Locations of police Tomas, arrests, beatings, info
about weapons
414 638
Scheduled demonstration places, actions of demonstra-
tors
373 596
Specific info medical, legal, technical, food, safe places 161 297
Info about specific groups, unions, gays, missing,
politicians, etc.
147 215
About media and availability 103 163
Table 4.10: Descriptions of available annotation categories and their observed frequencies in
our dataset. Number of tweets (T) and retweets (RT) for each category excluding “others”
category reported.
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Figure 4.13: Geographic distribution of tweets in our sample related to the discussion of
Gezi Park events. The histograms represent the total volume by latitude and longitude.
Content production crossed the Turkish national boundaries and spread in Europe, North
and South America.
4.3.3 Spatio-temporal Cues of the Conversation
Our first analysis aims at determining the extent to which the discussion about Gezi Park
attracted individual attention inside the national boundaries of Turkey, where the movement
began, and how much of this conversation spread worldwide.
We focus on the subset of tweets in our dataset that have geo-coordinates attached
(in the form of latitude/longitude). Such tweets are likely to be posted by GPS-enabled
devices (like smartphones) and represent only a small fraction of total tweets (≈ 1.84% of
our sample), which is consistent with similar studies [83]. Yet they provide a very precise
picture of the geospatial dynamics of content production. Figure 4.13 maps the sources of
these tweets. The figure also shows histograms on the horizontal and vertical axes, that
illustrate the distribution of tweets occurring in the corresponding locations, binned by
latitude and longitude. From this figure the global nature of the discussion about Gezi Park
events clearly emerges. Although a large fraction of tweets originated in Turkey, a significant
amount was produced in Europe, North and South America (especially the United States
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Figure 4.14: Distribution of top 10 languages in tweets about the protest. Language infor-
mation was extracted from the tweet meta-data.
Figure 4.15: Left: Trend similarity matrix for 12 cities in Turkey. From the dendrogram
on top we can isolate three distinct clusters. Right: Location of the cities with trend
information, labeled by the three clusters induced by trend similarity.
and Brazil). Other noteworthy countries involved in the discussion are the Philippines,
Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
Attention abroad was signaled by the presence of trending hashtags and phrases in the
worldwide Twitter trends. Among these, the main protest hashtag, #direngeziparki, trended
several times between May 31st and June 2nd, 2013; #TayipIstifa, invoking Erdogan’s
resignation, appeared on June 6th, 2013. Worldwide attention is also evident in the variety
of languages exhibiting hashtags related to the Gezi Park events, as displayed in Figure 4.14.
After Turkish, the most popular languages were English, Spanish, and Portuguese.
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We also explored the local dimension of the conversation, focusing on the discussion inside
the Turkish borders. Our goal was to determine whether any patterns of discussion of similar
topics of conversation emerged. In Figure 4.15 we show the trend similarity matrix computed
among the sets of trending hashtags and phrases occurring in each of the 12 cities where
Twitter trends are monitored. Each location is described by a frequency vector of occurrences
of the observed trends. The similarity between pairs of cities is calculated as the cosine
similarity of their trends frequency vectors. Above the matrix we show the dendrogram
produced by hierarchical clustering, where it is possible to appreciate the separation in
three clusters. Such clusters neatly correspond to three different geographic areas of Turkey.
Physical proximity seems to play a crucial role in determining the similarity of topical
interests of individuals, consistent with other recent results [116].
The clusters found with our trend similarity analysis also seem to match the Turkish
geopolitical profiles. Eskisehir, Kayseri and Gaziantep (in the red cluster) are all central
Anatolian cities where the president’s party (AKP) has a stronghold (though the CHP
opposition party edged out the AKP in the March 2014 mayoral race); they are more
culturally conservative and homogeneous. Izmir, Istanbul, Bursa, Ankara, and Adana (green
cluster) are the largest cities in Turkey with diverse populations. Finally, Antalya and Mersin
(blue cluster) are seacoast cities that are known for supporting the one of the main opposition
parties (CHP or MHP). Further work is needed to understand why Konya is assigned to this
cluster, as it is considered a major religiously conservative center (where the AKP mayoral
candidate secured more than 64% of the vote in the 2014 mayoral elections) that has little
in common with the Mediterranean cities.
Let us explore the temporal dimension of the Gezi Park discussion. We wanted to de-
termine whether the activity on social media mirrored on-the-ground events, and whether
bursts of online attention coincided with real-world protest actions. We analyzed the time
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Figure 4.16: Hourly volume of tweets, retweets and replies between May 30th and June
20th, 2013 (top). The timeline is annotated with events from Table 4.7. User (center) and
hashtag (bottom) hourly and cumulative volume of tweets over time.
series of the volume of tweets, retweets and replies occurring during the 27-day-long obser-
vation window, as reported in Figure 4.16 (top panel). The discussion was driven by bursts
of attention that largely corresponded to major on-the-ground events (cf. Table 4.7), similar
to what has been observed during other social protests [84]. It is also worth noting that the
numbers of tweets and retweets are comparable throughout the entire duration of the con-
versation, suggesting a balance between content production (i.e., writing novel posts) and
consumption (i.e., reading and rebroadcasting posts via retweets). In the middle panel of
Figure 4.16 we report the number of users involved in the conversation at a given time, and
the cumulative number of distinct users over time (dashed red line); similarly, in the bottom
panel of the figure, we show the total number of hashtags related to Gezi Park observed
at a given time, and the cumulative number of distinct hashtags over time. We note that
approximately 60% of all users observed during the entire discussion joined in the very first
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few days, whereas additional hashtags emerged at a more regular pace throughout a longer
period. This suggests that the conversation acquired traction immediately, and exploded
when the first on-the-ground events and police action occurred.
4.3.4 User Roles and Their Evolution
Our second experiment aims at investigating what roles users played in the Gezi Park conver-
sation and how they exercised their influence on others. We also seek to understand whether
such roles changed over time, and, if so, to what extent such transformation reshaped the
conversation.
Figure 4.17 shows the distribution of social ties reporting the two modalities of user
connectivity, namely followers (incoming) and followees (outgoing) relations. The dark cells
along the diagonal indicate that most users have a balanced ratio of ingoing and outgoing
ties. Users below the diagonal follow more than they are followed. Note that most users are
allowed to follow at most 1000 people. Finally, above the diagonal, we observe users with
many followers. Note the presence of extremely popular users with hundreds of thousands
or even millions of followers. The number of followers has a broad distributions and seems
largely independent of the number of followees.
The presence of highly followed users in this conversation raises the question of whether
their content is highly influential. Following a methodology inspired by González-Bailón et
al. [138], we determined user roles as a function of their social connectivity and interactions.
Figure 4.18 gives an aggregated picture of the distribution of user roles during the Gezi Park
conversation. The y-axis shows the ratio between number of followees and followers of a given
user; the x-axis shows the ratio between the number of retweets produced by a user and
the number of times other users retweet that user. In other words, the vertical dimension
represents social connectivity, whereas the horizontal dimension accounts for information
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Figure 4.17: Distribution of friends and followers of users involved in the Gezi Park conver-
sation.
diffusion. We can draw a vertical line to separate influential users on the left (i.e., those
whose content is most often retweeted by others) and information consumers on the right
(those who mostly retweet other people’s content). Influential users can be further divided
in two classes: those with more followers than followees (bottom-left) and those with fewer
followers (top-left), which we call hidden influentials. Similarly, information consumers can
be divided in two groups–rebroadcasters with a large audience (bottom-right), and common
users (top-right).
Figure 4.18 shows a static picture of aggregated data over the 27-day observation period.
To study how roles evolve as events unfold, we carried out a longitudinal analysis whose
results are provided in Figure 4.19. This figure shows the average displacement of each role
class, and the number of individuals in each class (circles), for each day. The displacement is
computed in the role space (that is, the space defined by the two dimensions of Figure 4.18).
Larger displacements suggest that individuals in a class, on average, are moving toward
other roles.
Various insights emerge from Figure 4.19: first, we observed that the classes of informa-
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Figure 4.18: Distribution of user roles as function of social ties and interactions.
tion producers (influentials and hidden influentials) are relatively stable over time; together
they include more than 50% of users every day, suggesting that many individuals in the
conversation had large audiences, and the content they produced was heavily rebroadcasted
by others (information consumers as well as other influentials). On the other hand, informa-
tion consumers show strong fluctuation: starting from an initial configuration with stable
roles (May 29–31), common users and rebroadcasters subsequently exhibit large aggregate
displacements in the role space (June 1–4). We also note a redistribution of the users in each
role: at the beginning of the protest a large fraction represents common users and rebroad-
casters, while, as time passed and events unfolded, these two classes shrank. This suggests
that common users and rebroadcasters acquired visibility and influence over time: some
fraction of these users moved from the role of information consumers to that of influentials,
such that their content wass consumed and rebroadcasted by others. In other words, the
discussion became more democratic over time, in that the control of information production
was redistributed to a larger population, and individuals acquired influence as the protests
unfolded.
80
Figure 4.19: Average displacement of roles over time for the four different classes of roles.
The size of the circles represents the number of individuals in each role.
4.3.5 Clustering User Roles Using Annotated Data
Clustering users based on their social connectivity and production of content provides overall
view about dynamics and behavior. Using information obtained from annotated content,
we can further identify users with different roles. In this section, we are using unsupervised
clustering framework to identify groups of users that produce or broadcast similar contents
according to our annotated dataset.
We can study individuals by their content production and consumption preferences. In-
dividuals share various content based on their motives about participating the protests.
Analyzing those content helps us to obtain crucial information about users. We compared
users by annotations of their tweets. Each user is represented as a vector of tweet anno-
tations where each category and their observed frequencies represent a feature. We also
consider tweets and retweets separately to highlight differences between information need
and creation. To compare users, we compute cosine similarity of their vector representations.
We considered 3 different annotations of tweets, namely “purpose”, “position”, and “in-
formation share”. Combinations of those 3 type of annotation is also considered.
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We clustered users by annotations of their contents using hierarchical clustering. In this
technique, distance between each pair of items used to compute clusters from bottom up by
agglomerating similar users in each step. In this analysis, we used complete linkage to merge
clusters in the hierarchy. One of the advantages of using hierarchical clustering is to tuning
threshold to decide number of clusters. We explored different threshold values to observe
outcomes of clustering algorithm. In Figure 4.20, we presented clusters of users in distance
matrix and hierarchy of clusters. In this analysis annotations on information share, purpose
and position were used together.
Figure 4.20: Hierarchical clustering of the users by using their similarities based on content
annotations.
Once we explore alternative clustering outcomes, we can select most appropriate cluster-
ing by looking distance matrix and dendrogram in hierarchical clustering shown in Fig.6. In
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this representation, we can choose 5 clusters as represented by different colors and branches
in dendrogram.
We can further explore content created or shared by average users in each group. We
can observe differences between average behaviors of groups. In Table 4.11, we summarized
most common annotation types for each group. For instance group 1 has only 4 users and
represent smallest group among 5 clusters. In this small group, we observe tweets related to
witnessing and information related to on-the-ground events. Users in this group seem very
active for protests. Another dimensions that we can investigate differences between groups
are annotation category and message type. Groups 2 and 4 mostly create their original
content, but 3rd and 5th groups tend to broadcast content produced by others. Content
from information share category, which aim to inform others about scheduled events and
locations of police mostly created by group 4 and broadcasted by group 5. Groups 2 and
3 are explicitly announcing their position and opinions about protests. All these groups
produce or broadcast particular type of content. Some of those contents overlap between
groups, but amount of contents differ.
4.3.6 Online Behavior and Exogenous Factors
Our concluding analysis focused on the way on-the-ground events affected online user behav-
ior. While analyzing our dataset we noticed an abnormal number of screen name changes,
as reported in Figure 4.21 (the screen name, not to be confused with the user name, is the
name displayed in one’s Twitter account). Many users changed their screen names five or
more times. This was an unusual observation that attracted our attention.
Further investigation revealed a collective synchronization process, as displayed in Fig-
ure 4.22. The changes in screen names represent reactions of users involved in the Gezi
Park conversation to external events: these users changed their Twitter screen names to
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ID (Size) Category Description Value
C1 (4)
purpose First person witness 11.75 (T)
info_share Locations of Police Tomas, Arrests, Beatings, Info about
Weapons
7.0 (T)
info_share Scheduled Demon Places, Actions of Demonstrators 5.75 (T)
purpose Hashtag 4.0 (T)
purpose Links to outside information 1.5 (T)
C2 (16)
purpose Others 0.75 (T)
position General Opinion 0.38 (T)
purpose Sharing specific information heard about 0.31 (T)
info_share Locations of Police Tomas, Arrests, Beatings, Info about
Weapons
0.25 (T)
position General Opinion 0.25 (R)
C3 (33)
position General Opinion 0.18 (T)
purpose Sharing specific information heard about 0.18 (T)
purpose Others 0.15 (R)
purpose Sharing specific information heard about 0.15 (R)
info_share Scheduled Demon Places, Actions of Demonstrators 0.12 (T)
C4 (28)
purpose Sharing specific information heard about 0.32 (T)
info_share Scheduled Demon Places, Actions of Demonstrators 0.18 (T)
info_share About Media and availability 0.14 (T)
purpose Links to outside information 0.14 (T)
info_share Locations of Police Tomas, Arrests, Beatings, Info about
Weapons
0.11 (T)
C5 (25)
purpose Opinion statement 0.32 (T)
purpose Sharing specific information heard about 0.32 (R)
purpose General information 0.28 (R)
info_share Locations of Police Tomas, Arrests, Beatings, Info about
Weapons
0.2 (R)
purpose Support for movement 0.2 (T)
Table 4.11: Average behavior of users in each cluster. Most common 5 activity reported for
each group along with their amount and type of share (being retweet or tweet)
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Figure 4.21: Distribution of the number of screen name changes among users during the
Gezi Park events.
Figure 4.22: Among the many users who changed screen names, this chart plots the fractions
who adopted different nicknames over time in respons to external events.
reflect sobriquets attributed to them by their political leaders. One example is the adoption
of “TC” (standing for Turkiye Cumhuriyeti — Turkish Republic). As a reaction to iden-
tity issues, several users started using TC in front of their screen names. Another relevant
example is Erdogan’s speech of June 2, during which he referred to protesters as maraud-
ers (çapulcu), marginals (marjinal or drunks (ayyas). Individuals responded by changing
their screen names to include such nicknames as a sign of protest against the government’s
attempt to discredit the protest participants and minimize the relevance of their actions.
This phenomenon illustrates how online and oﬄine worlds are tightly interconnected, deeply
affecting each other.
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CHAPTER 5
Early Detection of Promoted Campaigns
An increasing number of people rely, at least in part, on information shared on social media
to form opinions and make choices on issues related to lifestyle, politics, health, and prod-
ucts purchases [17, 44, 226]. Such reliance provides a variety of entities — from single users
to corporations, interest groups, and governments — with motivation to influence collec-
tive opinions through active participation in online conversations. There are also obvious
incentives for the adoption of covert methods that enhance both perceived and actual pop-
ularity of promoted information. There are abundant recently reported examples of abuse:
astroturf in political campaigns, or attempts to spread fake news through social bots under
the pretense of grassroots conversations [35, 115, 240]; pervasive spreading of unsubstanti-
ated rumors and conspiracy theories [34]; orchestrated boosting of perceived consensus on
relevant social issues performed by governments [255]; propaganda and recruitment by ter-
rorist organizations, like ISIS [31,118]; and actions involving social media and stock market
manipulation [277].
The situation is ripe with dangers as people are rarely equipped to recognize propaganda
or promotional campaigns as such. It can be difficult to establish the origin of a piece of
news, the reputation of its source, and the entity behind its promotion on social media,
due both to the intrinsic mechanisms of sharing and to the high volume of information that
competes for our attention. Even when the intentions of the promoter are benign, we easily
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interpret large (but possibly artificially enhanced) popularity as widespread endorsement of,
or trust in, the promoted information.
There are at least three questions about information campaigns that present scientific
challenges: what, how, and who. The first concerns the subtle notion of trustworthiness of
information, ranging from verified facts [74], to rumors and exaggerated, biased, unverified or
fabricated news [34,240,314]. The second considers the tools employed for the propaganda.
Again, the spectrum is wide: from a known brand that openly promotes its products by
targeting users that have shown interest, to the adoption of social bots, trolls and fake or
manipulated accounts that pose as humans [76,115,148,282]. The third question relates to
the (possibly concealed) entities behind the promotion efforts and the transparency of their
goals. Even before these question can be explored, one would need to be able to identify an
information campaign in social media. But discriminating such campaigns from grassroots
conversations poses both theoretical and practical challenges. Even the very definition of
“campaign” is conceptually difficult, as it entangles the nature of the content (e.g., product
or news), purpose of the source (e.g., deception, recruiting), strategies of dissemination (e.g.,
promotion or orchestration), different dynamics of user engagement (e.g., the aforementioned
social bots), and so on.
This paper takes a first step toward the development of computational methods for the
early detection of information campaigns. In particular, we focus on trending memes and on
a special case of promotion, namely advertisement, because they provide convenient opera-
tional definitions of social media campaigns. We formally define the task of discriminating
between organic and promoted trending memes. Future efforts will aim at extending this
framework to other types of information campaign.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of collected data about promoted and organic trends on
Twitter.
Promoted Organic
Dates 1 Jan– 31 Apr 2013 1–15 Mar 2013
No. trends 75 852
mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
Avg. no. tweets 2,385 6,138 3,692 9,720
Avg. no. unique users 2,090 5,050 2,828 8,240
Avg. retweet ratio 42% 13.8% 33% 18.6%
Avg. reply ratio 7.5% 7.8% 20% 21.8%
Avg. no. urls 0.25 0.176 0.15 0.149
Avg. no. hashtags 1.7 0.33 1.7 0.78
Avg. no. mentions 0.8 0.28 0.9 0.35
Avg. no. words 13.5 2.21 12.2 2.74
5.1 The Challenge of Identifying Promoted Content
On Twitter, it is common to observe hashtags — keywords preceded by the # sign that
identify messages about a specific topic — enjoying sudden bursts in activity volume due
to intense posting by many users with an interest in the topic [181,215,310]. Such hashtags
are labeled as trending and are highlighted on the Twitter platform. Twitter algorithmically
identifies trending topics in a predetermined set of geographical locations. Although Twitter
recently included personalized and clustered trends, the ones in the collection analyzed
here correspond to single hashtags selected on the basis of their popularity. Unfortunately,
detailed knowledge about the algorithm and criteria used to identify organic trends is not
publicly available [274]. Other hashtags are exposed prominently after the payment of
a fee by parties that have an interest in enhancing their popularity. Such hashtags are
called promoted and often enjoy subsequent bursts of popularity similar to those of trending
hashtags, therefore being listed among trending topics.
Of course, once Twitter labels a hashtag as trending, it is not necessary to detect whether
or not it is promoted — this information is disclosed by Twitter. However, since it is
difficult to manually annotate a sufficiently large datasets of campaigns, we use organic
and promoted trending topics as a proxy for a broader set of campaigns, where promotion
mechanisms may be hidden. Our data collection methodology provide us with a large
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Figure 5.1: Time series of trending hashtags. Comparison of the time series of the volume
(number of tweets per hour in our sample) relative to promoted (left) and organic (right)
trends with similar temporal dynamics.
source of reliable “ground truth” labels about promotion, which represent an ideal testbed
to evaluate detection algorithms. These algorithms have to determine whether or not a
hashtag is promoted based on information that would be available even in cases where the
nature of a trend is unknown. We stress that our goal of distinguishing mechanisms for
promoting popular content is different from that of predicting viral topics, an interesting
area of research in its own right [65,66,297].
Discriminating between promoted and organically trending topics is not trivial, as Ta-
ble 5.1 illustrates — promoted and organic trending hashtags often have similar character-
istics. One might assume that promoted trends display volume patterns characteristic of
exogenous influence, with sudden bursts of activity, whereas organic trends would conform
to more gradual volume growth patterns typical of endogenous processes [181, 216, 263].
However, Fig. 5.1 shows that promoted and organic trends exhibit similar volume patterns
over time. Furthermore, promoted hashtags may preexist the moment in which they are
given the promoted status and may have originated in an entirely grassroots fashion. It is
therefore conceivable for such hashtags to display features that are largely indistinguishable
from those of other grassroots hashtags about the same topic, at least until the moment of
promotion.
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Figure 5.2: Cumulative fraction of tweets as a function of time. On average, only 13% of
the tweets in the organic class and 15% of the tweets in the promoted class are produced
prior to the trending point. The majority of tweets are observed after the trending point,
with a rapid increase around trending time.
The analysis in this paper is motivated by the goal of identifying promoted campaigns
at the earliest possible time. The early detection task addresses the difficulty of judging
the nature of a hashtag using only the limited data available immediately before trending.
Fig. 5.2 illustrates the shortage of information available for early detection. It is also con-
ceivable that once the promotion has triggered interest in a hashtag, the conversation is
sustained by the same mechanisms that characterize organic diffusion. Such noise around
popular conversations may present an added difficulty for the early detection task.
The major contribution of this paper, beyond formulating the problem of detection of
campaigns in social media, is the development and validation of a supervised machine learn-
ing framework that takes into consideration the temporal sequence of messages associated
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Figure 5.3: Screenshot of Twitter U.S. trends taken on Jan. 6, 2016. The hashtag #CES2016
was promoted on this date.
with a trending hashtag on Twitter and successfully classifies it as either “promoted” (adver-
tised) or “organic” (grassroots). The proposed framework adopts time-varying features built
from network structure and diffusion patterns, language, content and sentiment information,
timing signals, and user meta-data. In the following sections we discuss the data we collected
and employed, the procedure for feature extraction and selection, the implementation of the
learning framework, and the evaluation of our system.
5.2 Data and Methods
5.2.1 Dataset Description
The dataset adopted in this study consists of Twitter posts (tweets) that contain a trending
hashtag and appeared during a defined observation period. Twitter provides an interface
that lists trending topics, with clearly labeled promoted trends at the top (Fig. 5.3). We
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crawled the Twitter webpage at regular intervals of 10 minutes to collect all organic and
promoted hashtags trending in the United States between January and April 2013, for a
total of N = 927 hashtags. This constitutes our ground-truth dataset of promoted and
organic trends.
We extracted a sample of organic trends observed during the first two weeks of March
2013 for our analysis. While Twitter allows for at most one promoted hashtag per day,
dozens of organic trends appear in the same period. As a result, our dataset is highly
imbalanced, with the promoted class more than ten times smaller than the the organic
one (cf. Table 5.1). Such an imbalance, however, reflects our expectation to observe in
the Twitter stream a minority of promoted conversations blended in a majority of organic
content. Therefore we did not balance the classes by resampling, to study the campaign
detection problem under realistic conditions.
Hashtags may trend multiple times on Twitter. However, those in our collection only
trended once during our observation period. For each trend, we retrieved all tweets con-
taining the trending hashtag from an archive containing a 10% random sample of the public
Twitter stream. The collection period was hashtag-specific: for each hashtag we obtained
all tweets produced in a four-day interval, starting two days before its trending point and
extending to two days after that. This procedure provides an extensive coverage of the
temporal history of each trending hashtag in our dataset and its related tweets, allowing us
to study the characteristics of each trend before, during, and after the trending point.
Given that each trend is described by a collection of tweets over time, we can aggregate
data in sliding time windows [t, t + `) of duration ` and compute features on the subsets
of tweets produced in these windows. A window can slide by time intervals of duration δ.
The next window therefore contains tweets produced in the interval [t + δ, t + ` + δ). We
experimented with various time window lengths and sliding parameters, and the optimal
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performance is often obtained with windows of duration ` = 6 hours sliding by δ = 20
minutes.
We have made the IDs of all tweets involved in the trending hashtags analyzed in this
paper available in a public dataset (carl.cs.indiana.edu/data/ovarol/trend-dataset.
tar.gz).
5.2.2 Features
Our framework computes features from a collection of tweets in some time interval. The
system generates 487 features in five different classes: network structure and information
diffusion patterns, content and language, sentiment, timing, and user meta-data. The classes
and types of features are reported in Table 5.2 and discussed next. All of the feature time
series in this study are available in our public dataset.
5.2.2.1 Network and Diffusion Features
Twitter actively fosters interconnectivity. Users are linked by means of follower/followee
relations. Content travels from person to person via retweets. Tweets themselves can be
addressed to specific users via mentions. The network structure carries crucial information
for the characterization of different types of communication. In fact, the usage of network
features significantly helps in tasks like astroturf detection [240]. Our system reconstructs
three types of networks: retweet, mention, and hashtag co-occurrence networks. Retweet
and mention networks have users as nodes, with a directed link between a pair of users
that follows the direction of information spreading — toward the user retweeting or being
mentioned. Hashtag co-occurrence networks have undirected links between hashtag nodes
when two hashtags have occurred together in a tweet. All networks are weighted according
to the number of interactions and co-occurrences. For each network, a set of features is
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Table 5.2: List of 487 features extracted by our framework.
N
et
w
or
k
(†
) Number of nodes Number of edges
(*) Strength distribution (*) In-strength distribution
(*) Out-strength distribution (*) Distribution of connected components size
Network density Density of the largest connected component
Mean shortest path length of the LCC
U
se
r
(*) Sender’s follower count (*) Sender’s followee count
(*) Sender’s number of favorite tweets (*) Sender’s number of statuses
(*) Sender’s number of lists subscribed to (*) Originator’s follower count
(*) Originator’s followee count (*) Originator’s number of favorite tweets
(*) Originator’s number of Twitter statuses (*) Originator’s number of lists subscribed to
T
im
in
g Number of tweets appeared in a given window (*) Time between two consecutive tweets
(*) Time between two consecutive retweets (*) Time between two consecutive mentions
C
on
te
nt (*) Number of hashtags in a tweet (*) Number of mentions in a tweet
(*) Number of URLs in a tweet (*,**) Frequency of POS tags in a tweet
(*,**) Proportion of POS tags in a tweet (*) Number of words in a tweet
(*) Entropy of words in a tweet
S
en
ti
m
en
t
(***) Happiness scores of aggregated tweets (***) Valence scores of aggregated tweets
(***) Arousal scores of aggregated tweets (***) Dominance scores of single tweets
(*) Happiness score of single tweets (*) Valence score of single tweets
(*) Arousal score of single tweets (*) Dominance score of single tweets
(*) Polarization score of single tweets (*) Entropy of polarization scores of single
tweets
(*) Pos. emoticons entropy of single tweets (*) Neg. emoticons entropy of single tweets
(*) Emoticons entropy of single tweets (*) Ratio between pos. and neg. score of sin-
gle tweets
(*) Number of pos. emoticons in single tweets (*) Number of neg. emoticons in single tweets
(*) Total number of emoticons in single tweets Ratio of tweets that contain emoticons
†We consider three types of network: retweet, mention, and hashtag co-occurrence networks.
* Distribution types. For each distribution, the following eight statistics are computed and used as
individual features: min, max, median, mean, std. deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and entropy.
** Part-of-Speech (POS) tag. There are nine POS tags: verbs, nuns, adjectives, modal auxiliaries,
pre-determiners, interjections, adverbs, wh-, and pronouns.
*** For each feature we compute mean and std. deviation.
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computed, including in- and out-strength (weighted degree) distribution, density, shortest-
path distribution, and so on. (cf. Table 5.2).
5.2.2.2 User-based Features
User meta-data is crucial to classify communication patterns in social media [115,206]. We
extract user-based features from the details provided by the Twitter API about the author
of each tweet and the originator of each retweet. Such features include the distribution
of follower and followee numbers, and the number of tweets produced by the users (cf.
Table 5.2).
5.2.2.3 Timing Features
The temporal dimension associated with the production and consumption of content may
reveal important information about campaigns and their evolution [129]. The most basic
time-related feature we considered is the number of tweets produced in a given time interval.
Other timing features describe the distributions of the intervals between two consecutive
events, like two tweets or retweets (cf. Table 5.2).
5.2.2.4 Content and Language Features
Many recent papers have demonstrated the importance of content and language features
in revealing the nature of social media conversations [47, 90, 184, 197, 209]. For example,
deceiving messages generally exhibit informal language and short sentences [50]. Our system
extracts language features by applying a Part-of-Speech (POS) tagging technique, which
identifies different types of natural language components, or POS tags. The following POS
tags are extracted: verbs, nouns, adjectives, modal auxiliaries, pre-determiners, interjections,
adverbs, pronouns, and wh-pronouns (for details and examples see www.comp.leeds.ac.uk/
ccalas/tagsets/upenn.html). Tweets can be therefore analyzed to study how such POS
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tags are distributed. Other content features include the length and entropy of the tweet
content (cf. Table 5.2).
5.2.2.5 Sentiment Features
Sentiment analysis is a powerful tool to describe the attitude or mood of an online conversa-
tion. Sentiment extracted from social media conversations has been used to forecast oﬄine
events, including elections and financial market fluctuations [42, 272], and is known to af-
fect information spreading [119,207]. Our framework leverages several sentiment extraction
techniques to generate various sentiment features, including happiness score [172], arousal,
valence and dominance scores [295], polarization and strength [305], and emotion score [4]
(cf. Table 5.2).
5.2.3 Feature Selection
Our system generates a set I of |I| = 487 features (cf. Table 5.2) designed to extract
signals from a collection of tweets and distinguish promoted trends from organic ones. Some
features are more predictive than others; some are by definition correlated with each other
due to temporal dependencies. Most of the correlations are related to the volume of data.
Analysis of feature correlations illustrated in Fig. 5.4. As we can see, many pairs of features
are highly correlated. For instance the two most correlated features immediately prior to the
trending point are the size of the hashtag cooccurrence network and the size of its largest
connected component (Pearson’s ρ = 0.75). This is why it is important to perform feature
selection to eliminate redundant features and identify a combination of features that yield
good classification performance.
There are several methods to select the most predictive features in a classification task
[146]. We implemented a simple greedy forward feature selection method, summarized as
96
Figure 5.4: Pairwise correlation between features averaged across trends (top) and histogram
of correlation values (bottom).
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follows: (i) initialize the set of selected features S = ∅; (ii) for each feature i ∈ I−S, consider
the union set U = S∪{i}; (iii) train the classifier using the features in U ; (iv) test the average
performance of the classifier trained on this set; (v) add to S the feature that provides the
best performance; (vi) repeat (ii)–(v). We terminate the feature selection procedure if the
AUC (cf. Sec. 5.2.5) increases by less than 0.05 between two consecutive steps. Most of
the experiments terminate after selecting fewer than 10 features. The time series for the
selected features are passed as input to the learning algorithms. In the next subsections we
provide details about our experimental setting and learning models.
5.2.4 Experimental Setting
Our experimental setting follows a pipeline of feature selection, model building, and per-
formance evaluation. We apply the wrapper approach to select features and evaluate per-
formance iteratively [161]. During each iteration (Fig. 5.5), we train and evaluate models
using candidate subsets of features and expand the set of selected features using the greedy
approach described in Sec. 5.2.3. Once we identify the set of features that performs best,
we report results of experiments using only this set of features.
In each experiment and for each feature, an algorithm receives in input a time series
with L = 35 data points to carry out its detection. The length of the time series and its
delay D with respect to the trending point are discussed in Sec. 5.3; different experiments
will consider different delays.
A set of feature time series is used to either train a learning model or evaluate its
accuracy. The learning algorithms are discussed in the next subsection. For evaluation,
we compute a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which plots the true positive
rate (TPR) versus the false positive rate (FPR) at various thresholds. Accuracy is evaluated
by measuring the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) [112] with 10-fold cross validation,
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and averaging AUC scores across the folds. A random-guess classifier produces the diagonal
line where TPR equals FPR, corresponding to a 50% AUC score. Classifiers with higher
AUC scores perform better and the perfect classifier in this setting achieves a 100% AUC
score. We adopt AUC to measure accuracy because it is not biased by the imbalance in our
classes (75 promoted trends versus 852 organic ones, as discussed earlier).
5.2.5 Learning Algorithms
Let us describe the learning systems for online campaign detection based on multidimen-
sional time-series data from social media. We identified an algorithm, called K-Nearest
Neighbor with Dynamic Time Warping (KNN-DTW), that is capable of dealing with multi-
dimensional time series classification. For evaluation purposes, we compare the classification
results against two baselines: SAX-VSM and KNN. These three methods are described next.
5.2.5.1 KNN-DTW Classifier
KNN-DTW is a state-of-the-art algorithm to classify multidimensional time series, illus-
trated in Fig. 5.5. During learning, we provide our model with training and testing sets
generated by 10-fold cross validation. Time series for each feature are processed in parallel
using dynamic time warping (DTW), which measures the similarity between two time series
after finding an optimal match between them by “warping” the time axis [33]. This allows
the method to absorb some non-linear variations in the time series, for example different
speed or resolution of the data.
For efficiency, we initially apply a time series coarsening strategy called piece-wise ag-
gregation. We split each original time series into p equally long sections and replace the
time-series values by the section averages, reducing the dimensionality from L to L′ = L/p.
For trend i and feature k, we thus obtain a coarsened time series f ik = {f ik,1, f ik,2, · · · , f ik,L′}.
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Figure 5.5: Wrapper method description for KNN-DTW. We present the pipeline of our
complete system, including feature selection and model evaluation steps. Input data feed
into the system for training (green arrow) and testing (blue arrow) steps.
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Then, DTW computes the distance between all pairs of points of two given trend time series
f ik and f
j
k . Each element of the resulting L
′×L′ distance matrix isM ijk (t, t′) = (f ik,t−f jk,t′)2.
Points closer to each other are more likely to be matched. To create a mapping between
the two time series, an optimal path is computed over the time-series distance matrix. A
path must start from the beginning of each time series and terminate at its end. The path
between first and last points is then computed by minimizing the cumulative distance (γ)
over alternative paths. This problem can be solved via dynamic programming [33] using the
following recurrence: γ(t, t′) = M(t, t′)+min{γ(t−1, t′−1), γ(t−1, t′), γ(t, t′−1)} (indices
i, j, k dropped for readability). The distance γijk is used as the ij-th element of the N ×N
trend similarity matrix Γk.
The computation of similarity between time series using DTW requires O(L′2) opera-
tions. Some heuristic strategies use lower-bounding techniques to reduce the computational
complexity [169]. Another technique is to re-sample the data before adopting DTW. Our
coarsening approach reduces the computational costs by a factor of p2. We achieved a sig-
nificant increase in efficiency with marginal classification accuracy deterioration by setting
p = 5 (L′ = 7).
In the evaluation step, we use the K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) algorithm [86] to assign
a class score to a test trend q. We compare q with each training trend i to obtain a DTW
distance γiqk for each feature k. We then find the K = 5 labeled trends with smallest
DTW distance from q, and compute the fraction of promoted trends sqk among these nearest
neighbors. We finally average across features to obtain the class score s¯q. Higher values
of s¯q indicate a high probability that q is a promoted trend. Class scores, together with
ground-truth labels, allow us to compute the AUC of a model, which is then averaged across
folds according to cross validation.
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5.2.5.2 SAX-VSM Classifier
Our first baseline, called SAX-VSM, blends symbolic dimensionality reduction and vector
space models [251]. Time series are encoded via Symbolic Aggregate approXimation (SAX),
yielding a compact symbolic representation that has been used for time series anomaly and
motif detection, time series clustering, indexing, and more [188, 189]. A symbolic represen-
tation encodes numerical features as words. A vector space model is then applied to treat
time series as documents for classification purposes, similarly to what is done in information
retrieval. In our implementation, we first apply piece-wise aggregation and then use SAX
to represent the data points in input as a single word of L′ letters from an alphabet ℵ. This
choice and the parameters |ℵ| = 5 and L′ = 4 are based on prior optimization [251], and
variations to these settings only marginally affect performance. Each time-series value is
mapped into a letter by dividing the range of the feature values into |ℵ| regions in such
a way as to obtain equiprobable intervals under an assumption of normality [189]. In the
training phase, for each feature, we build two sets of words corresponding to organic and
promoted trends, respectively. In the test phase, a new instance is assigned to the class with
the majority of word matches across features. In case of a tie we assign a random class.
For further details about this baseline and its implementation, we refer the reader to the
SAX-VSM project website (github.com/jMotif/sax-vsm_classic).
5.2.5.3 K-Nearest Neighbors Classifier
Our second baseline is an off-the-shelf implementation of the traditional K-Nearest Neighbors
algorithm [86] for time-series classification. We used the Python scikit-learn package [232].
We selected KNN because it can capture and learn time-series patterns without requiring
any pre-processing of the raw time-series data. We created the feature vectors for each
trend by concatenating into a single vector the continuous-valued time series representing
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each feature. The nearest neighbor classifier computes the Euclidean distance between pairs
of single-vector time series. For a test trend, the class score is given by the fraction of
promoted trends among the K = 5 nearest neighbors.
5.3 Results
In this section, we present results of experiments design to evaluate the ability of our ma-
chine learning framework to discriminate between organic and promoted trends. For all
experiments, each feature time series consists of 120 real-valued data points equally divided
before and after the trending point. Although in principle we could use the entire time series
for classification, ex-post information would not serve our goal of early detection of social
media campaigns in a streaming scenario that resembles a real setting, where information
about the future evolution of a trend is obviously unavailable. For this reason, we consider
only a subset consisting of L data points ending with delay D since the trending point;
D ≤ 0 data points for early detection, D > 0 for classification after trending. We evaluate
the performance of our detection framework as a function of the delay parameter D. The
case D = 0 involves detection immediately at trending time. However, we also consider
D < 0 to examine the performance of our algorithms based on data preceding the trending
point; of course the detection would not occur until D = 0, when one would become aware
of the trending hashtag. Time series are encoded using the settings described above (L = 35
windows of length ` = 6 hours sliding every δ = 20 minutes).
5.3.1 Method Comparison
We carried out an extensive benchmark of several configurations of our system for campaign
detection. The performance of the algorithms as a function of varying delays D is plotted
in Fig. 5.6.
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In addition, we introduce random temporal shifts for each trend time series to test the
robustness of the algorithms. In real-world scenarios, one would ideally expect to detect a
promoted trend without knowing the trending point. To simulate such scenarios, we designed
an experiment that introduces variations that randomly shift each time series around its
trending point. The temporal shifts are sampled from gaussian distributions with different
variances. We present the results of this experiment in Fig. 5.7.
KNN-DTW and KNN display the best detection accuracy (measured by AUC) in general.
Their performance is comparable (Fig. 5.6). The AUC score is on average around 95% for
detecting promoted trends after trending. In the early detection task, we observe scores
above 70%. This is quite remarkable given the small amount of data available before the
trending point. KNN-DTW also displays a strong robustness to temporal shifts, pointing
to the advantage of time warping (Fig. 5.7). The KNN algorithm is less robust because it
computes point-wise similarities between time series without any temporal alignment; as the
variance of the temporal shifts increases, we observe a significant drop in accuracy. SAX-
VSM benefits from the time series encoding and provides good detection performance (on
average around 80% AUC) but early detection accuracy is poor, close to random for D < 0.
A strong feature of SAX-VSM is its robustness to temporal shifts, similar to KNN-DTW.
Our experiments suggest that temporal encoding is a crucial ingredient for successful
classification of time-series data. Encoding reduces the dimensionality of the signal. More
importantly, encoding preserves (most) information about temporal trends and makes an
algorithm robust to random shifts, which is an importance advantage in real-world scenarios.
SAX-VSM ignores long-term temporal ordering. KNN-DTW, on the other hand, computes
similarities using a time series representation that preserves the long-term temporal order,
even as time warping may alter short-term trends. This turns out to be a crucial advantage
to achieve both high accuracy and robustness.
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Figure 5.6: Methods comparison. Classification performance of different learning algorithms
on encoded and raw time series. The AUC is measured for various delays D. Confidence
intervals represent standard errors based on 10-fold cross validation.
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Figure 5.7: Temporal robustness. AUC of different learning algorithms with random tempo-
ral shifts versus the standard deviation of the shifts. We repeated the experiment for various
delay values D. Significance levels of differences in consecutive experiments are marked as
(*) p < 0.05 and (**) p < 0.01.
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Using AUC as an evaluation metric has the advantage of not requiring discretization
of scores into binary class labels. However, detection of promoted trends in real scenarios
requires binary classification by a threshold. In this way we can measure accuracy, precision,
recall, and identify misclassified accounts. Fig. 5.8 illustrates the distribution of probabilistic
scores produced by the KNN-DTW classifier as a function of the delay for the two classes of
trends, organic and promoted. The scores are computed for leave-out test instances, across
folds. An ideal classifier would separate these distributions completely, achieving perfect
accuracy. Test instances in the intersection between two distributions either are misclassified
or have low-confidence scores. Examples of misclassified instances are discussed in Sec. 5.3.3.
For D < 0, KNN-DTW generates more conservative scores, and the separation between
the organic and promoted class distributions is smaller. For D > 0, KNN-DTW scores
separate the two classes well. To convert continuos scores into binary labels, we calculated
the threshold values that maximize the F1 score of each experiment; this score combines
precision and recall. Trends with scores above the threshold are labeled as promoted. The
best accuracy and F1 score are obtained shortly after trending, at D = 20.
5.3.2 Feature Analysis
Let us explore the roles and importance of different features for trend detection. To this
end, we identify the significant features using the greedy selection algorithm described in
Sec. 5.2.3, and group them by the five classes (user meta-data, content, network, sentiment,
and timing) previously defined. We focus on KNN-DTW, our best performing method.
After selecting the top 10 features for different delays D, we compute the fractions of top
features in each class, as illustrated by Fig. 5.9. We list the top features for experiments
D = 0 (early detection) and D = 40 (classification) in Table 5.3.
The usefulness of content features does not appear to change significantly between early
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Figure 5.8: Distributions of KNN-DTW classifier scores. We use Kernel Density Estimation
(KDE), a non-parametric smoothing method, to estimate the probability densities based on
finite data samples. We also show the threshold values that separate the two classes yielding
an optimal F1 score.
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Figure 5.9: KNN-DTW feature analysis. Stacked plot showing how different feature classes
are represented among the top 10 selected features.
and late detection. In the early detection task, user features seem to contribute significantly
more than any other class, possibly because early adopters reveal strong signals about the
nature of trends. As we move past the trending point, signals from early adopters are flooded
by increasing numbers of participants. Timing and network features become increasingly
important as the involvement of more users allows to analyze group activity and network
structure patterns.
5.3.3 Analysis of Misclassifications
We conclude our analysis by discussing when our system fails. In Fig. 5.10, we illustrate
how some key features of misclassified trends diverge from the majority of the trends that
are correctly classified. We observe that some misclassified trends follow the temporal char-
acteristics of the other class. This is best illustrated in the case of volume (number of
tweets).
An advantage of continuous class scores is that we can tune the classification threshold
to achieve a desired balance between precision and recall, or between false positives and
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Table 5.3: Top 10 features for experiments with different values of D.
Delay Features Classes
40 Number of tweets Timing
Max. proportion of pronouns in a tweet Content
Entropy of hashtag cooccurrence network degree Network
Entropy of time between two consecutive mentions Timing
Mean time between two consecutive tweets Timing
Entropy of emoticon scores Sentiment
Median time between two consecutive tweets Timing
Max. originator’s followers count User
Kurtosis of mention network degree distribution Network
Entropy of pre-determiner POS frequency in a tweet Content
0 Max. hashtag cooccurrence network degree Network
Entropy of number of originator’s friends count User
Max. originator’s statuses count User
Median time between two consecutive tweets Timing
Skewness of time between two consecutive mentions Timing
Median of sender’s lists count User
Min. originator’s lists count User
Median of mention network out-degree Network
Min. frequency of adjective POS in a tweet Content
Mean frequency of noun POS in a tweet Content
false negatives. False negative errors are the most costly for a detection system: a promoted
trend mistakenly labeled as organic would easily go unchecked among the larger number
of correctly labeled organic trends. Focusing our attention on a few specific instances of
false negatives generated by our system, we gained some insight on the reasons triggering
the mistakes. First of all, it is conceivable that promoted trends are sustained by organic
activity before promotion and therefore they are essentially indistinguishable from organic
ones until the promotion triggers the trending behavior. It is also reasonable to expect a
decline in performance for long delays: as more users join the conversation, promoted trends
become harder to distinguish from organic ones. This may explain the dip in accuracy
observed for the longest delay (cf. Fig. 5.6).
False positives (organic trends mistakenly labeled as promoted) can be manually filtered
out in post-processing and are therefore less costly. However, analysis of false positives
provides for some insight as well. Some trends in our dataset, such as #watchsuitstonight
and #madmen, were promoted via alternative communication channels (television and radio),
rather than via Twitter. This has become a common practice in recent years, as more and
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Figure 5.10: Comparison between feature time series of misclassified and cor-
rectly classified trends. Time series of the top five features (columns) for pro-
moted (top) and organic (bottom) trends in the D = 40 detection task. The
black lines and gray areas represent the average and 95% confidence intervals of
time series for correctly classified trends. Time series of misclassified trends are
shown in red. Misclassified organic trends (false positives) are: #whyiwatchsuits,
#watchsuitstonight, #bobsantigoldlive, #evildead, #galaxyfamily, #gethappy,
#madmen, #makeboringbrilliant, #nyias, #oneboston, #stingray, #thewalkingdead, and
#timeto365. Misclassified promoted trends (false negatives) are: #1dmemories, #8thseed,
#20singersthatilike, #mentionsomeonecuteandbeautiful, #bnppo13, #ciaa, #expowest,
#jaibrooksforpresident, #justintimberweek, #kobalt400, #nyc, #realestate, #stars,
#sxsw, #wbc, and #wcw.
more Twitter campaigns are mentioned or advertised externally to trigger organic-looking
responses in the audience. Our system recognized such instances as promoted, whereas
their ground-truth labels did not. Those campaigns were therefore wrongly counted as false
positives, penalizing our algorithms in the evaluation. We find it remarkable that in these
cases our system is capable of learning the signature of promoted trends, even though the
promotion occurs outside of the social media itself.
5.4 Related Work
Recent work on social media provides a better understanding of human communication
dynamics such as collective attention and information diffusion [296], the emergence of
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trends [116,183], social influence and political mobilization [44,83,84,284].
Different information diffusion mechanisms may determine the trending dynamics of
hashtags and other memes on social media. Exogenous and endogenous dynamics produce
memes with distinctive characteristics [116, 119, 181, 216, 263]: external events occurring in
the real world (e.g., a natural disaster or a terrorist attack) can generate chatter on the
platform and therefore trigger the trending of a new, unforeseen hashtag; other topics (e.g.,
politics or entertainment) are continuously discussed and sometimes a particular conversa-
tion can accrue lots of attention and generate trending memes. The promotional campaigns
studied here can be seen as a type of exogenous factor affecting the visibility of memes.
The present work, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to investigate the early
detection of promoted content on social media. We focus our attention on advertisement,
which can play an important role in information campaigns. Trending memes are considered
an indicator of collective attention in social media [181,308], and as such they have been used
to predict real-world events, like the winner of a popular reality TV show [75]. Although
emerging from collective attention, communication on social media can be manipulated, for
example for political gain, as in the case of astroturf [204,240].
Recent work analyzes emerging topics, memes, and conversations triggered by real world
events [5,23,60]. Studies of information dissemination reveal mechanisms governing content
production and consumption [73] as well as prediction of future content popularity. Cheng et
al. study the prediction of photo-sharing cascade size [65] and recurrence [66] on Facebook.
Machine learning models can predict future popularity of emerging hashtags and content
on social media [191, 270]. Features extracted from content [157], sentiment [119, 173],
community structure [298, 299], and temporal signatures [120, 234, 294] are commonly used
to train such models. In this paper we leverage similar features, but for the novel task
of campaign detection. Furthermore, our task is more challenging because we deal with
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dynamic features whose changes over time are captured in high-dimensional time series.
Another topic related to our research is rumor detection. Rumors may emerge organically
as genuine conversation and spread out of control. They are characterized and sustained
by ambiguous contexts, where correctness and completeness of information or the meaning
of a situation is not obviously apparent [103]. Examples are situations of crisis or topics
of public debate [202]. Existing systems to identify rumors are based mostly on content
analysis [176, 235] and clustering techniques [114, 156]. An open question is to determine if
rumor detection might benefit from the wide set of feature classes we propose here.
The proposed framework is based on a mixture of features common in social media data,
including emotional and sentiment information. The literature has reported extensively on
the use of social media content to describe emotional and demographic characteristics of
users [119, 206, 207]. The use of language in online communities is the focus of two recent
papers [90, 197]: the authors observe that the language of social media users evolves, and
common patterns emerge over time. The language style of users adapts to achieve better
fitness in the conversation [92]. These findings suggest that language contains strong signals,
in particular if studied in conjunction with other dimensions of the data. Our study confirms
the importance of content for campaign detection.
Finally, our system builds on network features and diffusion patterns of social media
messages. Network structure and information diffusion in social media have been studied
extensively [15,182]. Network features are highly predictive of certain types of social media
abuse, like astroturf, that attempt to simulate grassroots online conversations [115, 240,
241, 282]. Such artificial campaigns produce peculiar patterns of information diffusion: the
topology of retweet or mention networks is often a stronger signal than content or language.
The present findings are consistent with this body of work, as network features are helpful
in detecting promoted content after trending.
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5.5 Conclusions
As we increasingly rely on social media to satisfy our information needs, it is important
to recognize the dynamics behind online campaigns. In this paper, we posed the problem
of early-detection of promoted trends on social media, discussed the challenges that this
problem presents, and proposed a supervised computational framework to attack it. The
proposed system leverages time series representing the evolution of different features char-
acterizing trending campaigns. The list includes features relative to network structure and
diffusion patterns, sentiment, language and content features, timing, and user meta-data.
We demonstrated the crucial advantages of encoding temporal sequences.
We achieved good accuracy in campaign detection. Our early detection performance is
remarkable when one considers the challenging nature of the problem and the low volume
of data available in the early stage of a campaign. We also studied the robustness of the
proposed algorithms by introducing random temporal shifts around the trending point,
simulating realistic scenarios in which the trending point can only be estimated with limited
accuracy.
One of the advantages of our framework is that of providing interpretable feature classes.
We explored how content, network, and user features affect detection performance. Extensive
feature analysis revealed that signatures of campaigns can be detected early, especially
by leveraging content and user features. After the trending point, network and temporal
features become more useful.
The availability of data about organic and promoted trends is subject to Twitter’s recipe
for selecting trending hashtags. There is no certain way to know if and when social media
platforms make any changes to such recipes. However, nothing in our approach assumes
any knowledge of a particular platform’s trending recipe. If the recipe changes, our system
could be retrained accordingly.
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This work represents an important step toward the automatic detection of campaigns.
The problem is of paramount importance, since social media shape the opinions of millions
of users in everyday life. Further work is needed to study whether different classes of
campaigns (say, legitimate advertising vs. terrorist propaganda) may exhibit characteristics
captured by distinct features. Many of the features leveraged in our model, such as those
related to network structure and temporal attributes, capture activity patterns that could
provide useful signals to detect astroturf [240]. Therefore, our framework could in principle
be applied to astroturf detection, if longitudinal training data about astroturf campaigns
were available.
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CHAPTER 6
Social Bots
Increasing evidence suggests that a growing amount of social media content is generated
by autonomous entities known as social bots [115]. As opposed to social media accounts
controlled by humans, bots are controlled by software, algorithmically generating content
and establishing interactions. While not all social bots are harmful, there is a growing record
of malicious applications of social bots. Some emulate human behavior to manufacture fake
grassroots political support [240], promote terrorist propaganda and recruitment [31, 118],
manipulate the stock market [113], and disseminate rumors and conspiracy theories [34].
Discussion of social bot activity, the broader implications on the social network, and
the detection of these accounts are becoming central research avenues [46, 113, 115, 180].
The magnitude of the problem is underscored by a social bot detection challenge recently
organized by DARPA to study information dissemination mediated by automated accounts
and to detect malicious activities carried out by these bots.
In this section, I will describe: (i) our approach, ranked third worldwide, on detecting
social bots for DARPA challenge [266]; (ii) BotOrNot system on social bot detection and
estimation of social bot population on Twitter [94,282]; (iii) analysis of Twitter human-bot
ecosystem [282].
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6.1 DARPA Social Bot Detection Challenge
In 2015, DARPA conducted a competition on social bot detection. Task of the challenge is
to identify influence bots supporting pro-vaccination discussion on Twitter. During the task
organic activity of the anti-vaccine community and automated posts by pro-vaccine bots are
mixed.
In this challenge, our team designed a system to track, store and process the streaming
data in real-time, while creating and updating the profiles of the accounts involved in the
conversation, along with their corresponding features. As a result our team successfully
identified all bots a week before the competition ended. We ranked as second fastest and
third most accurate team worldwide [266].
Our approach consist of three steps:
• Extraction of user-based features
• Filtering search space based on various heuristics
• Human assisted inspection of suspicious users and activities through visualizations and
interactive data exploration.
6.1.1 Feature Extraction
Our system builds a dynamic profile for each user participating in the conversation, for
rapid data access, analysis, and classification. The system also generates feature vectors
describing user profiles, updated every 6 hours, for classification purposes.
We adopt subset of features designed for our Twitter bot detection system BotOrNot.
The features can be summarized in five classes: user metadata, content, sentiment, network,
and temporal features. These features were carefully selected to reflect hand-crafted rules
designed to identify suspicious activity. Examples of such rules include: (i) low entropy of
topics of interest of the account, to identify thematically-focused users; (ii) anomalous levels
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of retweets or mentions, to capture users attempting to attract attention; (iii) anomalous
connectivity patterns, to detect suspicious cliques; (iv) coordinated attempts to address spe-
cific human users, to identify orchestrated targeting; (v) suspicious growth-rate in followers,
following, or content production levels; (vi) suspicious temporal patterns, as opposed of nat-
ural human circadian activity; (vii) high-volume of near-duplicate content; (viii) high-degree
of sentiment polarization; and (ix) interactions focused on users in the target population, as
opposed to external users.
As the stream of data was “replayed", our system periodically re-computed the user
feature vectors. The pairwise cosine similarity between the feature vectors highlights the
most similar pairs of users. Once we started to identify bots in the conversation, matching
the users most similar to the detected bots allowed for timely detection of new bots. In
Fig. 6.1 we show the distribution of the pairwise cosine similarity between pairs of feature
vectors characterizing bots, as opposed to bot-human pairs. The similarity between bots
tends to be higher than between bots and humans. The bot-bot similarity exhibits a bimodal
distribution that reflects the presence of two types of bots designed by two red teams: bots
designed by same team are more similar to each other.
6.1.2 Heuristic Filtering
In the earlier stage of the competition, we developed various heuristic techniques to narrow
the search space. Specifically, three strategies worked well: (i) analysis of the hashtag
co-occurrence network; (ii) duplicate-image search; and (iii) dynamic tracking of network
growth.
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of cosine similarity between pairs of accounts.
6.1.2.1 Hashtag Co-occurrence Network
Starting from a provided list of vaccine-related hashtags, we collected all tweets appear-
ing in the competition stream that contained at least one of those hashtags. The system
constructed a hashtag co-occurrence network, where each node represents a unique hashtag
and edges between two nodes are weighted by the number of times these two hashtag are
observed together in a tweet (see Fig. 6.2).
Using the hashtag co-occurrence networks, we were able to identify other campaign-
related hashtags to enrich the list of competition-relevant keywords. These were later used
to separate users into categories of pro- and anti-vaccine. The proportion of tweets users
posted containing any of these hashtags resulted in a strongly predictive feature.
6.1.2.2 Image Search
A common approach to create realistic bot profiles is to impersonate other users by cloning
information such as descriptions, names, and profile pictures. We built an algorithm to
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Figure 6.2: Hashtag co-occurrence network of vaccine discussions
detect duplicate user pictures using an online image search service1. Seven out of 39 bots
were detected using this heuristics. These bots used images from the Wikipedia domain as
their profile pictures.
6.1.2.3 Network Growth
In the competition dataset, a friendship network snapshot was provided every week. We
studied the topological changes of these temporal networks and identified users that created
suspicious levels of connections with anti-vaccine activists.
1www.tineye.com
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6.1.3 Interactive Data Exploration
Information visualization is a crucial part of the our decision system. Expert knowledge is
still required to conclude that a particular user is a social bot while limiting the number of
false positives. We developed a web application similar to the Twitter platform to create
and populate user profile information and timelines in real time (see Fig. 6.3). This inter-
face includes charts to monitor temporal changes in user metadata, such as the number of
followers, friends, and posts.
Figure 6.3: Interactive web interfaces designed to analyze user and content data.
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6.2 BotOrNot: Social Bot Detection System
In this section, we present BotOrNot, our platform to evaluate whether a Twitter account
is controlled by human or machine. This service is publicly available via the website2 or via
Python or REST APIs.3,4 BotOrNot takes a Twitter screen name, retrieves that account’s
recent activity, then computes and returns a bot-likelihood score. For website users, this
score is accompanied by plots of the various features used for prediction purposes as shown
in Fig. 6.4.
Figure 6.4: BotOrNot web interface
In the following part I would like to describe technical aspects of the system. We later
used BotOrNot system to analyze Twitter ecosystem and estimate amount of social bots in
the active Twitter population.
Let us first introduce our bot detection framework, which evaluates more than one thou-
sand features from a target user’s Twitter account, as well as from accounts of the target’s
2truthy.indiana.edu/botornot
3github.com/truthy/botornot-python
4truthy.indiana.edu/botornot/rest-api.html
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followers and followees (friends). These features are used to compare the target’s behavior
to that of known social bots. We later train and evaluate our initial model by using an
available social bot dataset and off-the-shelf learning algorithms.
6.2.1 Feature Extraction
We distill 1,150 features in six different classes using the Twitter API. The classes and types
of features are reported in Table 6.1 and described more in detail below.
6.2.1.1 User-based Features
Features extracted from user meta-data have been used to classify users and patterns be-
fore [115,206]. We extract user-based features from meta-data available through the Twitter
API. Such features include the number of friends and followers, the number of tweets pro-
duced by the users, profile description and settings (cf. Table 6.1).
6.2.1.2 Friends Features
Twitter actively fosters interconnectivity. Users are linked by following each other. Con-
tent travels from person to person via retweets. Tweets themselves address specific users
via mentions. We consider four types of friends (contacts): retweeting, mentioning, being
retweeted, and being mentioned users. For each group separately, we extract features about
language use, local time, popularity, etc. (cf. Table 6.1). Note that, due to limits of Twit-
ter’s REST API, we do not use the follower/followed relation beyond the total number of
each as mentioned in the previous section.
6.2.1.3 Network Features
The network structure carries crucial information for the characterization of different types
of communication. In fact, the usage of network features significantly helps in tasks like
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political astroturf detection [240]. Our system reconstructs three types of networks: retweet,
mention, and hashtag co-occurrence networks. Retweet and mention networks have users as
nodes, with a directed link between a pair of users that follows the direction of information
spreading: toward the user retweeting or being mentioned. Hashtag co-occurrence networks
have undirected links between hashtag nodes when two hashtags occur together in a tweet.
All networks are weighted according to the frequency of interactions or co-occurrences. For
each network we compute a set of features, including in- and out-strength (weighted degree)
distributions, density, clustering (cf. Table 6.1).
6.2.1.4 Time Features
Prior research suggests that the temporal signature of content production and consumption
may reveal important information about online campaigns and their evolution [117,129,283].
To extract this signal we measure several temporal features of user activity. The most basic
of these metrics is the rate of tweet production over various time periods. In addition, we
capture the distribution of time intervals between events (cf. Table 6.1).
6.2.1.5 Content and Language Features
Many recent papers have demonstrated the importance of content and language features
in revealing the nature of social media conversations [47, 90, 92, 184, 197, 209]. For example,
deceiving messages generally exhibit informal language and short sentences [50]. Our system
collects statistics about length and entropy of tweet text. Additionally, we extract language
features by applying the Part-of-Speech (POS) tagging technique, which identifies different
types of natural language components, or POS tags.5 Tweets are therefore analyzed to study
how POS tags are distributed (cf. Table 6.1).
5See: www.comp.leeds.ac.uk/ccalas/tagsets/upenn.html
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6.2.1.6 Sentiment Features
Sentiment analysis is a powerful tool to describe the emotions conveyed by a piece of text,
and more broadly the attitude or mood of an entire conversation. Sentiment extracted from
social media conversations has been used to forecast oﬄine events including financial market
fluctuations [42], and is known to affect information spreading [119, 207]. Our framework
leverages several sentiment extraction techniques to generate various sentiment features,
including arousal, valence and dominance scores [295], happiness score [172], polarization
and strength [305], and emotion score [4] (cf. Table 6.1).
6.2.2 Model Evaluation
To train our system we initially used a publicly available labeled dataset consisting of 15K
manually verified social bots and 16K legitimate (human) accounts identified via a honeypot
approach [180]. We collected the most recent tweets produced by those accounts using the
Twitter Search API.6 We limited our collection to 200 public tweets from a user timeline
and up to 100 of the most recent public tweets mentioning a user. This procedure yielded a
dataset of 2.6 million tweets produced by manually verified social bots and 3 million tweets
produced by users labeled as human. This bootstrap dataset helped us evaluate and compare
the performance of several machine learning algorithms and the contributions of different
feature sets.
We benchmarked our system using several off-the-shelf algorithms provided in the scikit-
learn library [232]. In a generic evaluation experiment, the classifier under examination is
provided with numerical vectors, each describing the features of an account. The classifier
returns a numerical score in the unit interval. A higher score indicates a stronger likelihood
that the account is a bot. A model’s accuracy is evaluated by measuring the Area Under the
6dev.twitter.com/rest/public
125
Table 6.1: List of 1150 features extracted by our framework.
U
se
r
m
et
a-
d
at
a
Screen name length
S
en
ti
m
en
t
(***) Happiness scores of aggregated tweets
Number of digits in screen name (***) Valence scores of aggregated tweets
User name length (***) Arousal scores of aggregated tweets
Time offset (sec.) (***) Dominance scores of single tweets
Default profile (binary) (*) Happiness score of single tweets
Default picture (binary) (*) Valence score of single tweets
Account age (days) (*) Arousal score of single tweets
Number of unique profile descriptions (*) Dominance score of single tweets
(*) Profile description lengths (*) Polarization score of single tweets
(*) Number of friends distribution (*) Entropy of polarization scores of single tweets
(*) Number of followers distribution (*) Pos. emoticons entropy of single tweets
(*) Number of favorites distribution (*) Neg. emoticons entropy of single tweets
Number of friends (S/R and rel. change) (*) Emoticons entropy of single tweets
Number of followers (S/R and rel. change) (*) Pos. and neg. score ratio of single tweets
Number of favorites (S/R and rel. change) (*) Number of pos. emoticons in single tweets
Number of tweets (per hour and total) (*) Number of neg. emoticons in single tweets
Number of retweets (per hour and total) (*) Total number of emoticons in single tweets
Number of mentions (per hour and total) Ratio of tweets that contain emoticons
Number of replies (per hour and total)
Number of retweeted (per hour and total)
F r
ie
n
d
s
(†
)
Number of distinct languages
N
et
w
or
k
(‡
)
Number of nodes
Entropy of language use Number of edges (also for reciprocal)
(*) Account age distribution (*) Strength distribution
(*) Time offset distribution (*) In-strength distribution
(*) Number of friends distribution (*) Out-strength distribution
(*) Number of followers distribution Network density (also for reciprocal)
(*) Number of tweets distribution (*) Clustering coeff. (also for reciprocal)
(*) Description length distribution
Fraction of users with default profile
Fraction of users with default picture
C
on
te
nt (*,**) Frequency of POS tags in a tweet
T
im
in
g (*) Time between two consecutive tweets
(*,**) Proportion of POS tags in a tweet (*) Time between two consecutive retweets
(*) Number of words in a tweet (*) Time between two consecutive mentions
(*) Entropy of words in a tweet
†We consider four types of connected users: retweeting, mentioning, retweeted, and mentioned.
‡We consider three types of network: retweet, mention, and hashtag co-occurrence networks.
* Distribution types. For each distribution, the following eight statistics are computed and used as
individual features: min, max, median, mean, std. deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and entropy.
** Part-of-Speech (POS) tag. There are nine POS tags: verbs, nuns, adjectives, modal auxiliaries,
pre-determiners, interjections, adverbs, wh-, and pronouns.
*** For each feature, we compute mean and std. deviation of the weighted average across words in
the lexicon.
receiver operating characteristic Curve (AUC) with 5-fold cross validation, and computing
the average AUC score across the folds, as shown in Fig. 6.5. The best classification perfor-
mance of 0.95 AUC was obtained by the Random Forest algorithm. In the rest of the paper
we use the Random Forest model trained using 100 estimators and the Gini coefficient as a
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Figure 6.5: Classification performance of our system for four different classifiers. Accuracy
is computed by five-fold cross validation and measured by the area under the ROC curve.
Figure 6.6: Performance across feature classes.
criterion of measuring the quality of splits.
To analyze the importance of each feature class, we can train the classifier using only
the corresponding subset of features. We repeated the performance evaluation experiments
considering only user, friends, network, content, temporal, and sentiment feature classes.
In Fig. 6.6 we present the performance of classifiers using the different feature subsets. We
achieved best performance with user meta-data features; content features were also shown
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to be effective for the classification of social bots. Other feature classes yielded acceptable
performance above 0.8 AUC.
6.3 Online Human-Bot Interactions: Detection, Estimation, and Char-
acterization
In this section, we use our bot detection system to evaluate a large-scale collection of users.
The performance of our detection system is evaluated against both an existing public dataset
and an additional sample of manually annotated Twitter accounts. We enrich the models
trained using existing bot data with the new annotations and investigate the effects of
different datasets and classification models. We also classify a sample comprising millions of
English-speaking active users. We use different models to estimate the percentage of Twitter
accounts exhibiting social bot characteristics.
6.3.1 Model Improvement Using Manually Annotated Data
To obtain an updated evaluation of the accuracy of our classifier, we constructed an addi-
tional, manually annotated collection of Twitter user accounts. We leveraged these manual
annotations to evaluate the model trained using the honeypot dataset and then to update
the classifier’s training data, producing a merged dataset to train a new model with better
generalization for more sophisticated accounts.
6.3.1.1 Data Collection
Our data collection focused on active users producing content in English, as inferred from
profile meta-data. We identified active users by monitoring a large Twitter stream, account-
ing for approximately 10% of public tweets, for 3 months starting in October 2015. Sampling
from the public stream allows us to focus on active users while avoiding the biases of other
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methods such as snowball and breadth-first sampling [130], which rely on the selection of
an initial groups of users.
To restrict our sample to recently active users, we introduce the further criteria that
they must have produced at least 200 tweets in total and 90 tweets during the three-month
observation window (one per day on average). From our original sample, 14 million user
accounts meet both criteria.We consider users in the highlighted area as active users. For
each of these accounts, we collected their tweets through the Twitter Search API.7 We
restricted the collection to the most recent 200 tweets and 100 mentions of each user, as
described earlier. Owing to Twitter API limits, this greatly improved our data collection
speed. However this limitation adds noise to the features, due to the scarcity of data available
to compute them.
6.3.1.2 Manual Annotations
We computed classification scores (defined in the unit interval) for each of the active accounts
using our initial classifier trained on the honeypot dataset. We then grouped accounts by
their bot scores, allowing us to evaluate our system across the spectrum of human and bot
accounts. We randomly sampled 300 accounts from each bot score decile, yielding a balanced
set of 3000 accounts. These were manually annotated by inspecting their public Twitter
profile pages. In some cases there are obvious flags about bots, such as when an account
uses a stock profile image or retweets every message of another account within seconds. In
general, however, there is no simple set of rules to assess whether an account is human
or bot. Each annotator analyzed profile appearance, content produced and retweeted, and
interactions with other users in terms of retweets and mentions. The final decision reflects
each annotator’s opinion and are restricted to: human, social bot, or undecided. Accounts
labeled as undecided were eliminated from further analysis.
7http://dev.twitter.com/rest/public/search
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Figure 6.7: Accuracy of the model using the human annotations as the ground truth. Agree-
ment is the average pairwise agreement of human annotators, presented with standard errors.
One author and four volunteers, familiar with Twitter, annotated all 3000 accounts.
Each annotator was assigned a random sample of accounts from each decile. We enforced
a minimum 10% overlap between annotations to assess the reliability of each annotator.
This yielded an average pairwise agreement of 75% and moderately high inter-annotator
agreement (Cohen’s κ = 0.41). We also computed the agreement between annotators and
classifier outcomes, assuming that a classification score above 0.5 is interpreted as a bot.
This resulted in an average pairwise agreement of 79% and moderate κ = 0.5.
6.3.2 Evaluating Models Using Annotated Data
To evaluate our classification system trained on the honeypot dataset, we examined the
classification accuracy separately for each bot-score decile. In Fig. 6.7, we present the
accuracies of the model and inter-annotator agreements for annotated accounts in each bin.
We achieved classification accuracy greater than 0.9 for the accounts in the (0.0, 0.4) range,
which includes mostly human accounts. We also observe accuracy above 0.7 for scores in the
(0.8, 1.0) range (mostly bots). Accuracy for boundary accounts ranges between 0.6 and 0.8.
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Figure 6.8: ROC curves of models trained and tested on different datasets. Accuracy is
measured by AUC.
Intuitively, this range contains the most challenging accounts to label, making it difficult
both for human annotators and for machine learning to achieve very high accuracy. When
the accuracy of each bin is weighted by the population density in the large-scale sample, we
obtain 86% accuracy overall.
We also compare annotator agreement scores for the accounts in each bot-score decile.
We observe that agreement scores are higher for bins containing human accounts and lower
for bots, indicating that it is more difficult for human annotators to identify social bots.
6.3.3 Dataset Effect on Model Accuracy
We can update our classification models by combining the manually annotated accounts
with the honeypot dataset. We hypothesize that the recently collected bots in the annotated
dataset may be more sophisticated than the ones obtained years earlier with the honeypot
method. Fig. 6.8 illustrates the results of experiments designed to investigate our capability
to detect such bots. The baseline ROC curve is obtained by testing the honeypot model,
described in Sec. 6.2.2, on the manually annotated dataset. Unsurprisingly the baseline
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Figure 6.9: Distribution of classifier score for human and bot accounts in the two datasets.
accuracy (0.85 AUC) is lower than that obtained testing on the honeypot data (0.95 AUC),
because the model is not trained on the newer bots. We created multiple balanced datasets
and performed 5-fold cross-validation to evaluate the accuracy of the corresponding models:
• Annotation: We trained this model by only using annotated accounts and labels
assigned by the majority of annotators. Our framework yields 0.89 AUC, a reasonable
accuracy considering that the dataset contains recent and possibly sophisticated bots.
• Merged: We merged the honeypot and annotation datasets. The resulting classifier
achieves 0.94 AUC, only slightly worse than the honeypot model although the dataset
contains a variety of more recent and possibly sophisticated bots.
• Mixture: Using mixtures with different ratios of accounts from the annotated and
honeypot datasets, we obtain an accuracy ranging between 0.90 and 0.94.
In Fig 6.9, we plot the distributions of classification scores for human and bot accounts
according to each dataset. The mixture model trained on 2K annotated and 10K honeypot
accounts is used to compute the scores. Human accounts in both datasets have similar
distributions, peaked around 0.1. The difference between bots in the two datasets is more
prominent. Classifiers produce larger scores peaked around 0.9 for the simpler bots in the
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of prediction scores for different models. Each account is rep-
resented as a point in the scatter plot with a color determined by its ground-truth label.
Additional test points are randomly sampled from our large-scale collection. Pearson corre-
lations between scores are also reported, along with estimated thresholds and corresponding
accuracies.
honeypot dataset; the newer bots have smaller scores, peaked around 0.6, supporting our
hypothesis that they are more sophisticated, exhibiting some characteristics more similar to
human behavior yielding lower scores on average. This distinction emphasises the impor-
tance of setting proper boundaries between human and bot accounts to discriminate them
accurately.
We compared predicted scores by pairs of models for labeled human, bot and a random
subset of users (see Fig. 6.10). As expected, both models assign lower scores for humans
and higher for bots. High correlation coefficients indicate agreement between the models.
To infer a suitable threshold in classification score that separates human and bot accounts
for a given model, we computed classification accuracies for varying thresholds considering
all accounts scoring below each threshold as human.
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6.3.4 Estimation of Bot Population
In a 2014 report by Twitter to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the company
put forth an estimate that 8.5% of their user base consists of bots.8 We would like to
offer our own assessment of the proportion of bot accounts as measured with our approach.
Since our framework provides a continuous bot score as opposed to a discrete bot/human
judgement, we must first obtain an estimate of the bot-score threshold separating human
and bot accounts to estimate the proportion of bot accounts.
We computed estimations for the population of social bots using different models. This
approach allows us to identify lower and upper bounds for the prevalence of social bots.
Models trained using the annotated dataset alone yield estimates of up to 15% of accounts
being social bots. Recall that the honeypot dataset was obtained in 2011 and therefore does
not include newer, more sophisticated bots. Thus models trained on the honeypot data alone
are less sensitive to these sophisticated bots, yielding a more conservative estimate of 9%.
Mixing the training data from these two sources results in estimates between these bounds
depending on the ratio of the mixture, as illustrated in Fig. 6.11. Taken together, these
numbers suggest that estimates about the prevalence of social bots are highly dependent on
the definition and sophistication of the bots.
Some other remarks are in order: first, we do not exclude the possibility that very
sophisticated bots exist that can systematically escape a human annotator’s judgement.
These complex bots may be active on Twitter, and therefore present in our datasets, and
may have been incorrectly labeled as humans, making even the 15% figure a conservative
estimate. Second, increasing anecdotal evidence suggests the presence on social media of
hybrid human-bot accounts (sometimes referred to as cyborgs) that perform a broad range
of automated actions with some human supervision and intervention [70, 77]. Some have
8www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418091/000156459014003474/twtr-10q_20140630.
htm
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Figure 6.11: Estimation of bot population obtained from models with different sensitivity
to sophisticated bots. The main charts show the score distributions based on our dataset
of 14M users; accounts identified as bots are highlighted. The inset plots show how the
thresholds are computed by maximizing accuracy. The titles of each subplot reflect the
number of accounts from the annotated and honeypot datasets, respectively.
been allegedly used for terrorist propaganda and recruitment purposes. It remains unclear
how these accounts should be labeled, and how pervasive they are.
6.3.5 Characterization of User Interactions
Let us next characterize social connectivity, information flow, and shared properties of users.
We analyze the creation of social ties by accounts with different bot scores, and their inter-
actions through shared content. We also cluster accounts and investigate shared properties
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Figure 6.12: Distributions of bot scores for friends (top) and followers (bottom) of accounts
in different score intervals.
of users in each cluster. Here and in the remainder of this paper, bot scores are computed
with a model trained on the merged dataset.
6.3.5.1 Social Connectivity
To characterize the social connectivity, we collected the social networks of the accounts in
our dataset using the Twitter API. Resulting friend and follower relations account for 46
billion social ties, 7 billion of which represent ties between the initially collected user set.
Our observations on social connectivity are presented in Fig. 6.12. We computed bot-
score distributions of friends and followers of accounts for each score interval. The dark line
in the top panel shows that human accounts (low score) mostly follow other human accounts.
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Figure 6.13: Distribution of reciprocity scores for accounts in different score intervals.
The dark line in the bottom panel shows a principal peak around 0.1 and a secondary one
around 0.5. This indicates that humans are typically followed by other humans, but also
by sophisticated bots (intermediate scores). The lines corresponding to high scores in the
two panels show that bots tend to follow other bots and they are mostly followed by bots.
However simple bots (0.8–1.0 ranges) can also attract human attention. This happens
when, e.g., humans follow benign bots such as those that share news. This gives rise to the
secondary peak of the red line in the bottom panel. In summary, the creation of social ties
leads to a homophily effect.
Fig. 6.13 illustrates the extent to which connections are reciprocated, given the nature
of the accounts forming the ties. The reciprocity score of a user is defined as the fraction
of friends who are also followers. We observe that human accounts reciprocate more (dark
line). Increasing bot scores correlate with lower reciprocity. We also observe that simple bot
accounts (0.8–1.0 ranges) have bimodal reciprocity distributions, indicating the existence of
two distinct behaviors. The majority of high-score accounts have reciprocity score smaller
than 0.2, possibly because simple bots follow users at random. The slight increase as the
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Figure 6.14: Bot score distributions of users mentioned (top) and retweeted (bottom) by
accounts with different scores.
reciprocity score approaches one may be due to botnet accounts that coordinate by following
each other.
6.3.5.2 Information Flow
Twitter is a platform that fosters social connectivity and the broadcasting of popular content.
In Fig. 6.14 we analyze information flow in terms of mentions/retweets as a function of the
score of the account being mentioned or retweeted.
Simple bots tend to retweet each other (lines for scores in the 0.8–1.0 ranges peak around
0.8 in the bottom panel), while they frequently mention sophisticated bots (peaking around
0.5 in the top panel). More sophisticated bots (scores in the 0.5–0.7 ranges) retweet, but
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do not mention humans. They might be unable to engage in meaningful exchanges with
humans. While humans also retweet bots, as they may post interesting content (see peaks
of the dark lines in the bottom panel), they have no interest in mentioning bots directly
(dark lines in the top panel).
6.3.5.3 Clustering Accounts
To characterize different account types, let us group accounts into behavioral clusters. We
apply K-Means to normalized vectors of the 100 most important features selected by our
Random Forests model. We identify 10 distinct clusters based on different evaluation criteria,
such as silhouette scores and percentage of variance explained. In Fig 6.15, we present a
2-dimensional projection of users obtained by a dimensionality reduction technique called
t-SNE [192]. In this method, the similarity between users is computed based on their 100-
dimensional representation in the feature space. Similar users are projected into nearby
points and dissimilar users are kept distant from each other.
Let us investigate shared cluster properties by manual inspection of random subsets of
accounts from each cluster. Three of the clusters, namely C0–C2, have high average bot
scores. The presence of significant amounts of bot accounts in these clusters was manually
verified. These bot clusters exhibit some prominent properties: cluster C0, for example,
consists of legit-looking accounts that are promoting themselves (recruiters, porn actresses,
etc.). They are concentrated in the lower part of the 2-dimensional embedding, suggesting
homogeneous patterns of behaviors. C1 contains spam accounts that are very active but
have few followers. Accounts in C2 frequently use automated applications to share activity
from other platforms like YouTube and Instagram, or post links to news articles. Some of
the accounts in C2 might belong to actual humans who are no longer active and their posts
are mostly sent by connected apps.
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Figure 6.15: t-SNE embedding of accounts. Points are colored based on clustering in high-
dimensional space. For each cluster, the distribution of scores is presented on the right.
Cluster C3 contain a mix of sophisticated bots, cyborg-like accounts (mix of bot and
human features), and human users. Clusters of predominantly human accounts, namely
C4–C9, separate from one another in the embedding due to different activity styles, user
popularity, content production and consumption patterns. For instance, accounts in C7
engage more with their friends, unlike accounts from C8 that mostly retweet with little
other forms of interaction. Clusters C5, C6, and C9 contain common Twitter users who
produce experiential tweets, share pictures, and retweet their friends.
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6.4 Conclusions
Social media make it easy for accounts controlled by hybrid or automated approaches to
create content and interact with other accounts. Our project aims to identify these bots.
Such a classification task could be a first step toward studying modes of communication
among different classes of entities on social media.
In this article, we presented a framework for bot detection on Twitter. We introduced
our machine learning system that extracts more than a thousand features in six different
classes: users and friends meta-data, tweet content and sentiment, network patterns, and
activity time series. We evaluated our framework when initially trained on an available
dataset of bots. Our initial classifier achieves 0.95 AUC when evaluated by using 5-fold
cross validation. Our analysis on the contributions of different feature classes suggests that
user meta-data and content features are the two most valuable sources of data to detect
simple bots.
To evaluate the performance of our classifier on a more recent and challenging sample of
bots, we randomly selected Twitter accounts covering the whole spectrum of classification
scores. The accuracy of our initial classifier trained on the honeypot dataset decreased to
0.85 AUC when tested on the more challenging dataset. By retraining the classifier with
the two datasets merged, we achieved high accuracy (0.94 AUC) in detecting both simple
and sophisticated bots.
We also estimated the fraction of bots in the active English-speaking population on
Twitter. We classified nearly 14M accounts using our system and inferred the optimal
threshold scores that separate human and bot accounts for several models with different
mixes of simple and sophisticated bots. Training data have an important effect on classifier
sensitivity. Our estimates for the bot population range between 9% and 15%. This points
to the importance of tracking increasingly sophisticated bots, since deception and detection
141
technologies are in a never-ending arms race.
To characterize user interactions, we studied social connectivity and information flow
between different user groups. We showed that selection of friends and followers are corre-
lated with accounts bot-likelihood. We also highlighted how bots use different retweet and
mention strategies when interacting with humans or other bots.
We concluded our analysis by characterizing subclasses of account behaviors. Clusters
identified by this analysis point mainly to three types of bots. These results emphasize that
Twitter hosts a variety of users with diverse behaviors; this is true for both human and bot
accounts. In some cases, the boundary separating these two groups is not sharp and an
account can exhibit characteristics of both.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions
Social media are important tools and their efficient use promotes information dissemina-
tion, fosters connectivity between individuals, and helps accessibility and transparency of
knowledge. In the Internet age, we are endowed with the capability to observe activities of
the millions, to model interactions between individuals, and to discover unknown properties
of society. Using techniques from network science, computer science, and social science,
I presented studies of properties of socio-technical systems and built tools to ensure their
robustness against malicious intentions.
This dissertation presents several studies on the topics of information diffusion, online
discourse, and detection of campaigns and social bots. Our analysis on trend diffusion
shows that geography still plays a significant role in information dissemination. Analysis
on censorship reveals that withheld tweets foster curiosity of readers and yield increases
in popularity of censored user and content. Similar effects have been observed in printed
media, where editors leave censored content blank in their publications to draw attention
to the removed content. Our campaign detection framework also points to the importance
of user features to distinguish promoted content. I also built a system to detect social bots
and analyze their interactions on Twitter.
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7.1 Summary and Discussion of Contributions
In Chapter 2, I discuss the relationships between work presented in this dissertation and
existing social science literature. The following sections summarize the contributions of
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 and discuss their implications for future work.
7.1.1 Online Discourse
Online discourse is a broad topic that we discussed in this dissertation. I studied online
discourse from different perspectives: geography of information diffusion, effects of censor-
ship, and characterization of user roles during social protests. We learned lessons about how
geography plays a role on local trends, but national trends and censorship rely on global
ties. Our analysis of the Gezi movement highlights the importance of collective behavior
and points to the interplay between external events and online activities. Here I summarize
observations from our analysis of trend diffusion and online censorship.
• We describe a procedure to build a directed and weighted temporal dependence net-
work to infer the trendsetting and trend-following relationships among locations. We
provide a statistical characterization of trends, describing how they are distributed in
space and time.
• We describe two different dynamics that govern popularity of trends at the country
level, one for cities in each local geographic area and one for metropolitan areas.
We conclude by highlighting that the major metropolitan areas shape the country
trends significantly more than all other locations. We propose an interpretation for
the trendsetting role of major metropolitan areas, by noting their correspondence
with air traffic hubs and conjecturing that trends travel through air passengers, just
as infectious diseases.
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• We explore the spatio-temporal characteristics of censorship, that is, which govern-
ments requested censorship and how the volume of these requests changed over time.
• We show that IP-based censorship on Twitter is not an effective mechanism. We
analyze language and timezone preferences of the retweeting users as a proxy to user
location and show that the diffusion of the censored content is not limited to the
boundaries of the requesting governments, but spans larger populations.
• We point to an important observation on how the amount of censorship correlates with
the changes of user behavior. We observe an increase in the number of friends and
attention paid to censored content for those users targeted by increasing censorship.
Our analysis of social protests in Turkey helps us understand the dynamics of social
protests and user roles:
• We present methods to extract topically focused conversations about the social uprising
surrounding Gezi Park and related trending topics of conversation on Twitter.
• We explore the spatio-temporal characteristics of the conversation; that is, where
tweets about Gezi Park originated and what locations shared most similar topics and
trends. This analysis yields clusters of cities that are mostly consistent with the
country’s geopolitics.
• We analyze the emerging characteristics of users involved in the conversation about
Gezi Park protests on Twitter, the roles they played in this context, and how these
roles evolved as the protest unfolded. We find that influence was redistributed in the
user population over time, making the conversation more democratic.
• We show that online user behavior was affected by external factors, such as speeches
by political leaders or police action to hinder or suffocate the protests.
• We focus on leveraging hand-coded data with automated techniques to identify distinct
behavioral groups. We have learned that the primary role for users was in information
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dissemination to other participants in the demonstrations, but few messages indicated
any leadership role and users who tweeted directive messages did not do so consistently.
This section of the dissertation mainly addresses studies of information dissemination
and geography. I studied the role of geography on information diffusion to show that ge-
ography still plays a role in information diffusion. One can study the multiplex structure
of information and social networks to reveal hidden branches of diffusion trees. My analy-
sis of censorship shows interesting parallels with the historic practices of censorship, where
censorship promotes reader curiosity and motivates them to search for details.
We also studied social protest to investigate how different user roles emerge and evolve
over time. Emergent behavior in social systems yields interesting group dynamics: polariza-
tion, marginalization, and social upheavals. To study socio-technical systems, it is crucial
to understand group behaviors shaped by social norms. In future work, one can identify
the latent factors shaping group membership and changes in personal position for a cause.
Social media can influence and shape public opinion, and misinformation and social bots
play a significant role in affecting belief systems. I also want to test how public discourse
by politicians on social media can be used to direct limited attention to less important
conversations. I want to study persuasion and deception in the age of limited attention.
7.1.2 Campaign Detection
Online discourse can be manipulated and controlled. To study online campaigns, we focus on
trending memes on Twitter and on a special case of promotion, namely advertising, because
it provides a convenient operational definition of social media campaign. We formally define
the task of discriminating between organic and promoted trending memes. We built a
machine learning framework that exploits hundreds of social media signals over time to
capture signatures of orchestrated campaigns. This approach takes a first step toward the
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development of computational methods for the early detection of information campaigns.
We make the following contributions:
• We explore different methods for encoding feature time series. Using millions of tweets
containing trending hashtags, we achieve 75% AUC score for early detection, increasing
to above 95% after trending.
• We studied the robustness of systems to random shifts on temporal signals and pointed
to the strength of algorithms that capture patterns in time series.
• One of the advantages of our framework is that of providing interpretable feature
classes. We explored how content, network, and user features affect detection per-
formance. Extensive feature analysis revealed that signatures of campaigns can be
detected early, especially by leveraging content and user features. After the trending
point, network and temporal features become more useful.
The lessons learned from this project can be used to study complex persuasion. Adver-
tisers and political campaign organizers are actively developing strategies to reach out and
communicate with their targeted audience. Efforts in designing viral online campaigns yield
tools for modern marketing strategies. Unfortunately, entities with malicious intentions
can also benefit from such systems and adopt them to achieve their goals. Traditionally,
successful campaigns rely on carefully designed messages and punctual timing. Experts in
social psychology can identify possible concepts to frame campaigns for targeted groups.
The abundance of digital data and developments in personalization might facilitate targeted
campaigns and the ability to rapidly evaluate the effects of different strategies and frames.
In future work, one can build automated techniques to identify campaigns by detecting
behavioral anomalies at the conversation, account, or tweet level. Observations of account
activities at the group level can provide insightful details about coordination.
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7.1.3 Social Bots
Increasing evidence suggests that social bots have become a major problem for communica-
tion systems. We propose a framework to extract a large collection of features from data and
meta-data about social media users, including friends, tweet content and sentiment, network
patterns, and activity time series. We use these features to train highly-accurate models to
identify bots. For a generic user, we produce a [0, 1] score representing the likelihood that
the user is a bot. Our research on social bots was timely and we made important contri-
butions in this area. We published a highly cited review paper on social bots and released
an online bot detection system for academic and public use. Our research on social bots
yielded the following contributions:
• We participated in the DARPA bot detection challenge and completed the task as the
second fastest and third most accurate team.
• We classified a sample comprising millions of English-speaking active Twitter users.
We used different models to infer thresholds in the bot score that best discriminate
between humans and bots. We estimated that the percentage of Twitter accounts
exhibiting social bot behaviors is between 9% and 15%.
• We characterized friendship ties and information flow between users that show be-
haviors of different nature: human and bot-like. Humans tend to interact with more
human-like accounts than bot-like ones, on average. Reciprocity of friendship ties is
higher for humans. Simple bots target users more or less randomly, while sophisticated
bots can choose targets based on their intentions.
• Clustering analysis revealed certain specific behavioral groups of accounts. Manual
investigation of samples extracted from each cluster points to three distinct bot groups:
spammers, self promoters, and accounts that post content from connected applications.
• Our social bot classification framework was released online for public use. Since its
148
release date we received millions of requests.
The intents and strategies of malicious entities such as social bots and orchestrated
campaigns are either fully automated by software or directed by motivated human agents.
Armies of social bots and misinformation campaigns are executed to promote ideas, advertise
products, or sway public opinion. We have been observing social bots that attempt to
persuade, influence, and deceive. Recent advances in deep-learning technologies accelerate
fake persona generation [38, 185] and conversation models for social bots [186, 262]. Such
technologies make social bots difficult to detect and provide an advantage in this arms race.
In future work, I want to use my experience in the identification of social bots and
early detection of campaigns to isolate those activities and study their strategies in depth.
I am interested in building detection systems that can evolve to lead in this arms-race by
exploring behavioral signatures of users and characterizing their strategies.
Another important direction that is worth taking is studying the phenomenon called
account recycling. My guess is that active Twitter accounts remove all their content and
start a new persona for different campaigns or agendas. In this way, these accounts appear
to have a history and maintain their followers during the transition. This could be easily
monitored by tweet deletion notices.
7.2 Other Areas of Future Work
I am excited about the opportunities to mine social signals for gaining new insights about
human behavior and society. The world we have been experiencing is changing and we
have more accurate data with higher temporal resolution, as well as reflecting a detailed
picture of individual lives. The ethical collection of multi-modal data about individuals will
be instrumental in understanding human behaviors. In the future, I want to develop new
models and tools to study complexity in terms of analyzing behaviors of individuals. The
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Figure 7.1: As a future work, expertise gained by studying mobility, social networks and
knowledge networks can be applied to important problems around mental health, micro-
biome, and dream research.
most significant questions can be answered through connecting relevant problems that lie in
organized complexity. Interdisciplinary research is crucial to connect existing knowledge to
discover novel synthesis. I trained as a physicist and computer scientist that direct me to
study in domains of EEG signal processing [280], modeling group behaviors using statistical
mechanics, and analyzing fluctuations of proteins [286]. I always try to combine different
school of thoughts when approaching a novel problems.
My long-term research goal is to develop models that describe dynamically changing
intents and actions of individuals and groups. Network analysis, causal inference, and sta-
tistical learning techniques are core methods and I also want to employ deep learning models
as predictive models in my research. Some of these models have advantages in terms of ac-
curacy. However, certain sensitive domains require models with high interpretability and
explanations of outcomes. Combinations of models and awareness of their limitations are
important to study behaviors of individuals.
Modeling and detecting strategies employed by users is crucial for many reasons: under-
standing intents behind their actions, improving their well-being, and characterizing inter-
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actions between groups. Deviations from the regular patterns can also point to important
events and pre-cursors of significant transitions. Understanding changes in behavior helps
to study mood changes and to identify significant life events. I believe that my research
has potential implications for improving individual well-being, discovering new knowledge
on how diseases and mental health problems progress, and understanding the nature of con-
flicts between groups. In the following, I describe several future directions I am excited to
pursue (Fig. 7.1).
Identifying the intents of individuals and improving their well-being. One of
the applications of ego-centric network research is to model mental health problems. In this
domain, I would like to infer whether a user has issues like bipolar disorder and depression
based on prior online interactions. To improve such inferences, I am studying the transfer of
knowledge about users across platforms and datasets by employing deep learning, statistical
learning, and causal inference. My goal is to build models for interconnected data sources
to highlight the relationships between user attributes and behavioral markers. I am not
only interested in studying social networks, communication, and mobility, but also health
related precursor signals collected from biological data, personal logs, and other ego-centric
measurements. Once a particular group of people is selected on one platform, users with
similar characteristics can be identified on other platforms. Additional features about the
group can be extracted from these platforms to improve the inference model and predict user
behaviors. Developing ethical methods and tools is an important challenge of this project.
I want to study how privacy of the users can be preserved while research efforts are devoted
to learning about human behaviors. My goal is to formulate new hypotheses about disease
progression and develop mechanisms for support.
Studying dreams to decipher the unconscious mind. I want to pursue a per-
sonal interest in dreams by building collaborations with clinical psychologists. Previously, I
151
worked on multi-cultural analysis of dream interpretations to highlight global archetypes and
cultural differences [285]. Recently, I have been analyzing individual dream journals. Data
driven research to understand the meaning of dreams and their implications on real life can
be further improved by controlled experiments and data collection through mobile devices.
Collaborative work in this area, in my opinion, will be greatly rewarding to understand
unconscious behaviors.
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